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NOT JUST OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES: KENTUCKY
ASS’N OF HEALTH PLANS, INC. V. MILLER1 BOTTLES A
NEW TEST FOR STATE REGULATION OF INSURANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court begrudgingly hears ERISA2 cases.3 Therefore,
even without the two landmark cases decided during the 2002-03 term,4
one should not be surprised that an ERISA case would be lost in the
Supreme Court shuffle.5 Alas, hidden behind the constitutional
blockbusters lies an important case that represents a monumental point
in ERISA history and insurance law: Kentucky Association of Health
Plans, Inc. v. Miller.6
1. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc., v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003).
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000) and in several sections of 26
U.S.C. (tax code)). The stated purpose for ERISA was to
protect. . .participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the
disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other
information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
3. Tony Mauro, “Courtside” (July 14, 2003), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/
printerfriendly.jsp?c=LawArticle&t=PrinterFriendlyArticle&cid=1056139978950. At his annual
talk to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, Chief Justice William Rehnquist described ERISA as
“The Employee Retirement, etc. law,” saying that “you get so used to these acronyms that you
forget what they stand for.” Id. As Mauro notes, the Chief Justice said that “[t]he thing that stands
out about [ERISA cases] is that they’re dreary,” and the only reason they grant review to them was
“duty, not choice.” Id.
4. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (diversity in higher education is a compelling
state interest); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Texas law criminalizing consensual adult
sexual activity unconstitutional without any state interest).
5. Between the 2001 and 2002 terms, the Supreme Court heard four cases involving benefits
questions, and all four involved ERISA. Karen Lee, Supreme Court’s ERISA Decisions Could
Increase Health Plan Costs, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003, available at
http://www.benefitnews.com (noting this is remarkable considering how few lawsuits reach the
Supreme Court). Three of those decisions went against health plan providers. Id.
6. 538 U.S. 329 (2003). Chief Justice Rehnquist called Miller one of the term’s “Cinderella”
cases, meaning those cases that are “left behind to clean the stove while the constitutional cases go
to the ball.” Mauro, supra note 3.
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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)7
was Congress’ response to instability in the private pension fund field.8
Much of its legislative history revolved around reforming the private
pension industry, 9 and not employee benefit plans for non-pensioners.10
A complex and poorly worded clause11 preempts all state laws that
“relate to” employee benefit plans12 but “saves” those state laws that
regulate insurance.13 When managed care organizations began providing
7. See supra note 2.
8. See Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d, § 7:9 (2003)
[hereinafter COUCH] (outlining the specific congressional findings that prompted ERISA’s
enactment); Health, Educ., and Human Servs. Div., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Employer-Based
Health Plans: ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA 30 (GAO/HEHS-95-167 1995)
[hereinafter ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES] (providing a short background on lost retirement
benefits and pre-ERISA pension legislation).
9. See Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court
Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951, 972 (2000) (noting, in extensive
detail throughout the article, that the legislative history included a comprehensive investigation of
the consumer abuses in the private pension industry that formed the impetus for ERISA’s
enactment); 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 7:15 (stating that “disclosure of information as a primary
means of protecting employee benefits seems better suited to pensions . . . than health or disability
insurance”).
10. Bogan, supra note 9, at 103 (noting that ERISA “does not provide a complete and
coordinated network of rules to govern nonpension employee benefits”). See generally 1 COUCH,
supra note 8, § 7:15 (presenting general criticisms of ERISA and explaining the difference between
pension and welfare benefits).
11. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985) (“Fully aware of this
statutory complexity . . . .”). The Supreme Court noted that “[t]he two pre-emption sections, while
clear enough on their faces, perhaps are not a model of legislative drafting.” Id. at 739.
Simultaneously, the Court has referred to ERISA as a “comprehensive and reticulated statute.”
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981) (citing Nachman Corp. v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)). But see Bogan, supra note 9, at 973-77 (arguing
that ERISA is not comprehensive in regards to benefit plans by illustrating the comprehensive
regulation of pension funds and, in comparison, minimal requirements for benefit plans).
12. 29 U.S.C. §1144 (a) (2000) (preemption provision). Section 514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) reads:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this title and title
IV shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under
1003(b) of this title.
Id.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000) (savings clause). Section 514(b)(2)(A) of ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) reads: “Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this title shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance,
banking or securities.” Id. There is still a debate whether Congress purposely omitted substantial
regulation of non-pension benefit plans. Compare Bogan, supra note 9, at 977 (arguing that
Congress did not intend to regulate non-pension benefit plans) with ERISA, The Foundation of
Employee Health Coverage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the
House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 73-74 (2001) [hereinafter ERISA Hearing]
(statement of James A. Klein, American Benefits Council):
This [preemption of state laws relating to an employee benefit plan] was not an
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services to ERISA-covered plans, states were not able to regulate them
as they had done with traditional health care providers.14 In its place, the
public turned to the judiciary, and sometimes the state legislatures, for
protection.15 While state courts have expanded remedies for aggrieved
insureds, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the expansion of
ERISA’s statutory remedies to include state common law causes of
action in tort and contract against insurance-like benefit providers.16
inadvertent outcome . . . . In crafting [the] preemption provisions, Congress made a very
conscious choice by opting for a uniform Federal framework for employer-sponsored
health plans rather than regulation by fifty different states . . . . [T]he fact that ERISA
imposes more detailed standards on pension plans than it does on health plans is
evidence of where Congress perceived the more urgent concerns to be at the time of its
enactment, not evidence—as many wrongly assume—that ERISA was not intended to
fully apply to the health benefit plans sponsored by employers.
14. See, e.g., Katie Cook Morgan, Leaving the Management of “Managed Care” Up to the
States: The Health Insurance Industry and the Need for Regulation of the Regulators, 65 U. CIN. L.
REV. 225, 248-54 (1996) (arguing for a federal insurance commission to create rules and monitor
the states’ regulation of the insurance industry). Morgan contends that the current system of state
insurance regulation, which uses state statutes on unfair insurance trade practice and state
departments of insurance, leaves much uncovered and unexamined. Id. at 235.
15. Morgan, supra note 14, at 245-48 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of
administrative regulation and indirect judicial regulation). Bad faith laws are one way that the courts
have protected the rights of insureds by allowing damages beyond the insured interest. 1 ERIC
MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, § 8.8 (2d. 1996)
[hereinafter APPLEMAN]. Some state legislatures have enacted bad faith statutes that allow
aggrieved insureds to sue their insurer for the pain and suffering caused by an insurer’s bad faith
denial of benefits. E.g., ALA. CODE § 27-12-24 (2004); ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.125 (2004); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-461 (2004); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-66-206 (2004); CAL. INS. CODE §
790.03(h) (2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(h) (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-816(6)
(2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304(16) (2004); FLA. STAT. § 626.9541(l)(i) (2004); IDAHO
CODE § 41-1329 (2004); IND. CODE § 27-4-14.5 (2004); IOWA CODE § 507B.4(9) (2004); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 40-2404(9) (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176D, § 3(9) (2004); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 500.2006 (2004); MINN. STAT. § 72A.20 (2004); MO. REV. STAT. § 375.936(10)
(2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-201 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1525(9) (2004); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 686A.310 (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417:4 (2003); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §
17:29B.4(9) (2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59a-16-20 (2003); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2601 (2003); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15 (11) (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-04-03(9) (2004); OR. REV. STAT. §
746.230 (2001); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1171.5(a)(10) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-8-104(8)
(2003); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.21-2 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724(9) (2003); VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-510 (2003); W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (2003). At the same time, the federal judiciary
has held some of these statutes preempted by ERISA. Elliot v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 337 F.3d
1138 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding a bad faith claim under Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act
completely preempted). Congressional action may be the only way to permit such claims against
benefit plans. Robert L. Aldisert, Note, Blind Faith Conquers Bad Faith: Only Congress Can Save
Us after Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1343, 1383-96 (1988).
16. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004) (holding that state
statutory cause of action against a health maintenance organization was properly removed to federal
court under the complete preemption doctrine); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987)
(holding that Mississippi’s common law of bad faith does not regulate insurance for the purposes of
the savings clause analysis). See also JOEL L. MICHAELS, “ERISA Preemption of State Law
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For nearly two decades, the “regulating insurance” aspect of the
savings clause was as confusing and convoluted as trying to distinguish
between the casks of unlabeled barrels of old wine that all smelled
horribly similar.17 Miller clarified the savings clause analysis by
establishing a broad, two-step test for determining if a state law regulates
insurance.18 However, the district courts have been sluggish in
recognizing the differences between the tests.19 The Supreme Court did
Claims,” 2 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE § 23:21.1 (2003) (“when an employee benefit plan not only
provides indemnity ‘benefits,’ but arranges for healthcare services in order to secure those benefits,
a claim that the plan acted negligently in it or its agents’ arranging for such services may not fall
under ERISA’s enforcement provisions and therefore may be subject to adjudication in state
court”). But see 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 7:15 (stating that critics view judicial decisions that
restrict the remedy for an employer’s or insurer’s breach of ERISA duties as one of the reasons that
insurers lack an incentive to behave reasonably and insureds have a reduced ability to enforce their
ERISA rights).
The Court refuses to find remedies not found within the wording of the statute. Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985) (refusing to imply a private right of action for
extra-contractual damages under ERISA § 1109(a) when neither the Act nor the legislative history
demonstrated a congressional intent to create a private right of action). Congress intended the
federal courts to develop some body of federal common law regarding ERISA, since Congress
could not take account of every conceivable activity under an ERISA plan. 1 COUCH, supra note 8,
§ 7:11 (noting that ERISA is a product of legal principles developed in several other fields of law,
especially trusts and contracts). However, the federal courts have not looked to state law principles
to develop this federal common law, especially as to ERISA remedies. Id. See, e.g., Joshua A.T.
Fairfield, Comment, ERISA Preemption and the Case for a Federal Common Law of Agency
Governing Employer-Administrators, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 234-52 (2001) (arguing that the
federal courts should adopt a common law of agency that conducts a fact-sensitive analysis of the
relationship between the employee, employer, and the insurer).
17. Miller, 538 U.S. at 340-41 (recognizing confusion in it and the lower courts as a result of
its prior decisions, and establishing a new two-part test for a state law regulating insurance). As
noted in text § II(A)(2)(c), the Supreme Court previously used “common sense” as the baseline for
the saving clause test, with the McCarran-Ferguson factors serving as “guideposts.” See id. at 341.
See text § III(B) and notes 127-36 for the new test. E.g., Russell Korobkin, The Failed
Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix It: Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 457, 531 (2003) (“As if trying to stuff a square peg into a round hole, a generation of
federal judges, including Supreme Court justices, clumsily attempted to resolve savings clause cases
using questions that were linguistically inappropriate and confusing”).
18. Miller, 538 U.S. at 341. See Korobkin, supra note 17, at 531 (commenting that the new
test is simpler and more appropriate than the business-rooted McCarran-Ferguson factors); but see
Jason S. Mazer, Pilot Life Pushed ERISA’s Preemption Pendulum to the Top of Its Arc, but Didn’t
Suspend the Law of Gravity, 78 FLA. BAR J. 10, 14 (Jan. 2004) (suggesting that the Court created
more questions than answers in Miller).
19. When bad faith claims were at issue, the district courts refused to analyze those laws
under the new test. Mazer, supra note 18, at 14 (noting the reluctance of the courts to re-analyze
these claims under Miller). See, e.g., Dolce v. Hercules Inc. Ins. Plan, No. 03-CV-1747, 2003 WL
22992148, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23890, (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2003); Ercole v. Conectiv, No. 03-186
GMS, 2003 WL 21104926, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8115, (D. Del. May 15, 2003); Nguyen v.
Healthguard of Lancaster, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 296, (E.D. Pa. 2003); Revells v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1366 (M.D. AL 2003) (“the law in this circuit is well established
that Alabama’s bad faith tort does not regulate insurance and is not saved from preemption. . . ‘[w]e
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not even cite to or rely on Miller when it struck down Texas’ patient
rights statute on the basis of ERISA preemption in Aetna Health Inc. v.
Davila.20 Nonetheless, Miller is a new blend of wine fermented from a
different batch of grapes than those used in the bottling of the casks of
old, unlabeled wine barrels that confused everyone, including the
Supreme Court.21 Its two-part test is a “clean break,”22 and not merely
the old McCarran-Ferguson grapes recycled into Miller’s vintage.
This Note examines the new test for whether state laws regulate
insurance for ERISA purposes and how the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudential philosophy toward the savings clause has changed. Part
II examines ERISA preemption and its impact on the health care
industry.23 Part III presents the appellate and Supreme Court decisions.24
Part IV analyzes how Miller changed the analytical framework for the
savings clause.25 Finally, Part V concludes that Miller is not just the old
wine test for the regulation of insurance repackaged in new bottles.26
II. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Preemption of State Law
In Gibbons v. Ogden,27 the Supreme Court held that the Supremacy

have held on more than one occasion, in precedent binding on this Circuit that the saving clause
does not apply to this tort.’”). After Davila, it would appear that the question of whether ERISA
preempts state bad faith claims has become moot. Davila, supra note 16, 124 S. Ct. at 2495.
20. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2500 (relying on the reasoning in Pilot Life for the proposition that
such state causes of action obstruct Congress’ objective and purpose in providing a uniform system
of providing benefits). Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, The ‘Aetna Health’ Ruling,
NAT’L L.J., Aug. 8, 2004 at 12 (noting that “[c]onspiciously absent from the discussion in Aetna
Health is any reference to” Miller). Two commentators have suggested that since Kentucky’s Any
Willing Provider statute did not provide a private cause of action, the Miller Court did not need to
address the issue that was later ultimately decided in Davila. Robert T. Horst & Mark H.
Rosenberg, Does Miller Change the Result? Preemption of Bad Faith Claims by ERISA, FOR THE
DEFENSE, May 2004, at 40-41.
21. Miller, 538 U.S. at 341 (noting that the “use of McCarran-Ferguson case law in the
ERISA context had misdirected attention, failed to provide clear guidance to lower federal courts,
and . . . added little to the relevant analysis”).
22. Id.
23. See text § II and notes 27-105.
24. See text § III and notes 106-49.
25. See text § IV and notes 150-245.
26. See text § V.
27. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (declaring the State of New York’s
navigable waters statute granting exclusive privileges to steamship travel in New York waters for
thirty years was repugnant to the Constitution and therefore void).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 8
VANSUCH.DOC

258

12/17/2004 12:13 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[38:253

Clause in the United States Constitution28 nullifies state laws that
“interfere with, or are contrary to, the laws of Congress.”29 When faced
with a preemption issue, the courts begin “with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . .
Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”30
1. Regulation of Insurance
Between 1869 and 1944, the states were the sole regulators of the
insurance industry.31 With the McCarran-Ferguson Act,32 Congress
28. Article VI, § 2 states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2.
29. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 211. Chief Justice Marshall then stated, “In every such case, the act
of Congress or the treaty is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of
powers not controverted, must yield to it.” Id.
30. Bogan, supra note 9, at 961 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947) (finding that the historic police powers of the state will not be deemed superseded by Federal
law unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress)).
31. In 1869, the Supreme Court held that “issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of
commerce.” Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869), overruled by U.S. v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), r’hg denied, 323 U.S. 811 (1944). The Court overturned
Paul in 1944, holding that Congress could regulate insurance transactions under the Commerce
Clause. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 552-53. This meant that the federal antitrust act –
the Sherman Act – applied to the insurance industry. Id. While the industry may have wanted
federal regulation in 1869, it feared such action in 1944. ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW § 21[a] (3d ed. 2002); Charles D. Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Antitrust
Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587, 591-92 (1978)
(noting the fear of federal takeover, including that of Justice Jackson in his dissent to South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass’n); Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance
Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REV. 545,
554 (1958) (noting that some in the industry thought the end of the world was about to come); Note,
Applications of Federal Antitrust Laws to the Insurance Industry, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1088, 1089
(1961-62) (highlighting the industry’s cry to Congress that the natural result of increased
competition would be many insolvent companies); Linda M. Lent, McCarran-Ferguson in
Perspective, 48 INS. COUNSEL J. 411, 412 (1981). To limit the impact of South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass’n, the industry focused its attention on legislation most favorable to it, which later
became the McCarran-Ferguson Act. JERRY, supra, § 21[a]. Congress initially rejected a complete
exemption from the antitrust acts for the industry, but eventually adopted legislation drafted and
proposed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). Weller, supra, at 59397, 599 (providing the legislative history of Mc-Carran-Ferguson and noting that Congress adopted
“almost verbatim” a couple of sections from the NAIC’s proposed bill).
32. McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000)).
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exerted federal authority to regulate the industry while simultaneously
announcing that it favored state regulation.33 The purpose was “to throw
the whole weight of [Congress’] power behind the state systems.”34 It
made “the business of insurance, and every person engaged therein”
subject to state laws that “relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business,”35 but a federal law that seeks to “invalidate, impair, or
supersede” a state law “enacted . . . for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business”
may preempt the state law if the federal law is “specifically relate[d] to
the business of insurance.”36
McCarran-Ferguson failed to define a critical phrase: “business of
insurance.”37 Eventually, the Supreme Court established a three-prong
test to determine whether an insurer’s activity constituted the “business
of insurance”: “first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder’s risk; second, whether the practice is an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the
insurance industry.”38
33. Section 1 of McCarran-Ferguson stated “that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business
by the several States.” McCarran-Ferguson Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2000).
34. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429-30 (1946). See Weller, supra note 31,
at 598-99 (noting that Congress and the NAIC shared the same purposes). NAIC considered the
preservation of state insurance commissioners’ powers of regulation and taxation as its highest
priority and greatest success. Id.
35. McCarran-Ferguson Act § 2(a) , 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2000) (“State regulation”).
36. McCarran-Ferguson Act, § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2000) (“Federal regulation”). This
subsection also states that “to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law,” the
Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914
would “be applicable to the business of insurance.” Id.; JERRY, supra note 31, § 21[b]. McCarranFerguson permits state and federal laws that both regulate the business of insurance to exist side-byside if the federal law is not construed as invalidating, impairing, or superseding a state law or if the
purpose of the state law is not to regulate the business of insurance. JERRY, supra, § 21[d].
37. JERRY, supra note 31, § 21[d][1] (noting that this omission lead to an uneasy
accommodation between state and federal authority in this area). The exemption was initially
interpreted expansively by the lower courts, only to be narrowed by the Supreme Court in
subsequent cases. Eric Peter Gillett, Comment, The Business of Insurance: Exemption, Exemption,
Who Has the Antitrust Exemption, 17 PAC. L.J. 261, 281-82 (1985-86).
38. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985) (citing Union Labor Life
Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982) (establishing the use of the three McCarran-Ferguson
factors in ERISA savings clause analysis)). These factors were only guideposts, and a state law did
not have to satisfy all three criteria to survive preemption. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,
536 U.S. 355, 373 (2002) (citing UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 373 (1999)). For a
discussion of what the Court meant by risk-spreading, see Robert P. Rothman, Note, The Definition
of “Business of Insurance” Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act After Royal Drug, 80 COLUM. L.
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2. Employee Benefit Plans
In the domain of employee benefit plans, ERISA can preempt a
state law in either of two ways: by completely preempting the state law
cause of action or by superseding the state law if the two conflict.39
a. Complete Preemption – ERISA § 502(a)
The Court may find that a statute has extraordinary preemptive
force, one that “converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into
one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint
rule.”40 Essentially, the only area of law that remains is federal, as “any
claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from
its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.”41
ERISA happens to be one of two laws42 in which the Supreme Court has

REV. 1475 (1980).
39. See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U.L.
REV. 687, 747 (1991), who notes that some courts see complete preemption as a species of field
preemption, which she views as incorrect. She says that the complete preemption doctrine has not
been viewed as a necessary incident of all field preemption. Id. She also notes that field
preemption—federal occupation of a field of regulation—arises in two ways: (1) by express
congressional enactment or administrative regulation, or (2) by judicial implication from a
legislative scheme. Id. at 738. See also ALI-ABA Conference on Life and Health Insurance
Litigation, SH084 Update on ERISA Litigation Developments 148, (May 1-2, 2003) (Elizabeth J.
Bondurant, Andrea K. Cataland, and Ronald Dean, authors) (explaining complete and conflict
preemption in terms of ERISA).
40. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987) (holding that Congress intended ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) to
completely preempt any civil complaint raising state law causes of action)) (noting that the
complete preemption doctrine is an independent corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule). See
David L. Trueman, “The Well Pleaded Complaint Rule and Complete Preemption,” HEALTH LAW
HANDBOOK § 2:4 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2003) (discussing the basis for this exception to the “well
pleaded complaint rule”).
41. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393. This is a “jurisdictional doctrine whose predicate is a
judicial determination that the ‘preemptive force’ of a particular federal regulatory law is ‘so
powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action.’” Hoke, supra note 39, at 747 (citing
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (holding that
even if ERISA precluded enforcement of the appellant’s state-law claims, ERISA created no
counterpart to appellant’s state-law claims and thus had not pre-empted the causes of action)). If a
state law claim is completely preempted, then it “arises under” federal law and meets federal
question jurisdiction. Id.
42. Hoke, supra note 39, at 747. The Labor Management Relations Act, specifically § 301 (29
U.S.C. § 185 (1988)), preempts state law claims whose resolution depends on interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement. Id. In Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 n.8 (citing Oneida Indian
Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 675 (1974) (noting the unique position of the Native
American petitioner in relation to the federal government and recognizing, in this situation, the
petitioner’s state law tort claim arose under federal law)), the Court noted that a state law tort claim
for right to possession of Indian tribal lands “arises under” federal law. Id.
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applied complete preemption.43
In the context of ERISA, complete preemption arises from the
statute’s civil enforcement provision, section 502(a).44 This section
provides limited, but exclusive, remedies45 that allow plan participants or
beneficiaries to recover a denied benefit, to enforce rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits under the terms of
the plan46 by suing the health plan, a plan administrator, or other
fiduciary.47 A “catch-all”48 provision permits a participant, beneficiary,
43. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (holding that the complete
preemption of certain state law claims by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) satisfies federal question
jurisdiction).
44. ERISA § 502(a) is codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000). See generally Barbara
Quackenbos, ERISA Litigation: Some Common Issues, in HEALTH CARE LITIGATION: WHAT YOU
NEED TO KNOW AFTER PEGRAM 205-19 (Karen S. Boxer et al. eds, 2000).
45. See Karl W. Pilger, Commentary, Title 29, Chapter 18, § 1144 Other Laws, 2003 NAT’L
INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY (noting that this provision, in connection with section 514(a),
supplants state law causes of action for wrongful denial of benefits, and claims regarding benefits
based upon breach of contract, negligence, bad faith, misrepresentation, estoppel, tortuous
interference with contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, defamation, emotional distress and
wrongful death from denial of medical care). But see STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS:
LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 9:17 (2d ed. 1998, Oct. 2003 update), § 9:19 (arguing that the
comprehensive civil enforcement scheme should not encompass state laws which regulate
insurance, including a judicially recognized cause of action for bad faith, specifically directed to the
insurance industry). See generally Charles J. Steele & Jacqueline M. Saue, “ERISA Remedies,” 2
HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE § 14:18 (2003); ASHLEY, supra § 9:17 (arguing that Congress did not
intend uniformity for insurance companies providing polices to employee welfare benefit plans).
ERISA was supposed to be a scheme by which plan administrators would be subject to a uniform
body of rules regulating their conduct, as implemented by the preemption clause, with the savings
clause preserving state regulation of insurance companies that provided policies to employee
welfare benefit plans. ASHLEY, supra § 9:17. If Congress wanted to create uniformity across the
board, there would have been no need for the savings clause. Id.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000). See ASHLEY, supra note 45, § 9:17 (describing this
remedy as the employee’s “breach of plan claim”). If a participant seeks to enforce personal rights,
then this is the section that allows such a claim. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(A) (2000).
47. Quackenbos, supra note 44, at 207. Relief under this provision is different from relief for
breach of fiduciary duty, supra note 39, or a statutory violation of ERISA. Id. Whether couched in
an enforcement of a beneficial right to a trust or contractual obligation, the usual defendants are the
health plan itself, the plan administrator, and possibly a claims administrator. Id. The employersponsor of the plan is not usually sued. Id. (citing Gelardi v. Pertec Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th
Cir. 1985)). However, in Garren v. John Hancock Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186, 187 (11th Cir.
1997), and Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 234-35 (3d Cir. 1994), the
courts allowed the person or entity that controls the plan administration to be sued. Quackenbos,
supra, at 207-08. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d) (2000) permits an employee benefit plan to sue and be sued.
For various breaches of fiduciary duties, plan participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and the
Secretary of the Department of Labor may sue for relief to remedy that breach. 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(2) (2000). 29 U.S.C. § 1109 establishes that the individual who breaches a fiduciary duty is
personally responsible:
to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to
restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of
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fiduciary, or the Secretary of Labor to bring a civil action to obtain other
legal or equitable relief if other remedies are unavailable.49 While these
remedies may adequately address the needs of pensioners, they are not
particularly suited to the type of damages that a benefit plan participant
will endure as a result of a denial of benefits.50 The Court has been
delicate in deciding whether state laws supplant or supplement this civil
enforcement scheme.51
b. Conflict Preemption – ERISA § 514(a)
Federal law may preempt state regulation over a particular area
even if Congress has not entirely displaced the matter.52 This occurs
when the state regulation conflicts with federal law, so that it “is
impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and

assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or
remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.
Id. This cause of action may be described as the “breach of trust claim.” ASHLEY, supra note 45, §
9:18.
48. Quackenbos, supra note 44, at 210. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996)
(noting that the structure of ERISA § 502 suggests that the “catch-all” provisions act as a safety net,
offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that § 502 does not elsewhere
adequately remedy).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000) provides for the following:
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of
the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations
or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the plan.
ASHLEY, supra note 45, § 9:18 (admitting that use of this term suggests relief traditionally available
in a court of equity). But “equitable” may also mean “fairly adapted to meet the needs of the
particular case.” Ashley views this as the “equitable relief claim.” Id.
50. 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 7:15 (“recovering amounts wrongfully denied by the plan
administrator may ordinarily be adequate as to pension benefits, since denial of these benefits rarely
causes the kind of significant consequential damages that may follow the denial of health care
benefits”). “An initial denial of [health care] benefits can prevent access to needed medical care,
leading to injuries or damages” that exceed the amount of the initial claim. Id.
51. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 386-87 (2002) (holding that
state-mandated independent review of and coverage for services deemed medically necessary by
such a reviewer were part of the state’s regulatory scheme and did not provide a new cause of action
under state law or enlarge a claim beyond benefits available through ERISA, and thereby fell within
the saving clause). See also William M. Acker, Jr., Can the Courts Rescue ERISA?, 29 CUMB. L.
REV. 285 (1998) (questioning whether Congress intended ERISA to have a broad remedial purpose,
and arguing that regardless, the implementation of this remedial scheme is in shambles because
Congress has abdicated a perceived societal problem to the courts).
52. See Bogan, supra note 9, at 961-62 n.43 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238, 248 (1984) (noting that a state law is pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal
law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress)).
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objectives of Congress.”53 Three subsections of ERISA section 514
provide the framework for federal preemption of state laws.54 Section
514(a) says that ERISA “supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”55 Even
state laws consistent with its substantive requirements are preempted
because this provision was intended to displace all state laws that fall
within its sphere.56 Congress wanted to eliminate the multiplicity of
regulation that hampered the efficient administration of benefit plans and
replace it with a uniform administrative scheme and standard procedures
for claims processing and benefit disbursement.57
Interpreting this clause caused courts major headaches.58 After
53. Id. (citations omitted).
54. See generally 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 7:31 (describing the preemption framework).
ERISA preemption is an affirmative defense that should be pleaded in the answer. Id. See Acker,
supra note 51, at 287 (calling ERISA preemption “super-duper preemption”).
55. 29 U.S.C. 1144(a) (2000). See generally 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 7:32 (discussing the
preemption clause and its “relate[s] to” language). 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c) (2000) defines “State laws”
and “States” for purposes of this clause as:
(1) The term “State law” includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State
action having the effect of law, of any State. A law of the United States applicable only
to the District of Columbia shall be treated as a State law rather than a law of the United
States.
(2) The term “State” includes a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any agency or
instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and
conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this title.
Id. Employee benefits, not “insurance,” are the focus of ERISA. 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 7:14.
56. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1983) (establishing the “related to” or “connection with” analyses
for the preemption clause)).
57. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001) (determining that ERISA expressly
preempted a state statute that automatically revoked the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of
a nonprobate asset upon divorce, as applicable to ERISA plans because the statute directly
conflicted with ERISA’s requirements that plans be administered, and benefits be paid, in
accordance with plan documents); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Inc., 514 U.S. 645, 661-62 (1995) (holding that a state statute that required hospitals
to collect surcharges from patients covered by a commercial insurer but not from patients insured by
other plans was not preempted by ERISA because the surcharges did not relate to an employee
benefit plan). But see Bogan, supra note 9, at 997 (arguing that preemption is contrary to ERISA’s
goals and objectives).
58. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523-24 (1981) (noting that the
phrase “relates to” “gives rise to some confusion where. . .it is asserted to apply to a state law
ostensibly regulating a matter quite different from pension plans”). See also Cal. Div. of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 334-35 (1997), where, in
concurrence, Justice Scalia illustrates the Court’s growing frustration with litigation over ERISA
preemption:
Since ERISA was enacted in 1974, this Court has accepted certiorari in, and decided, no
less than 14 cases to resolve conflicts in the Courts of Appeals regarding ERISA preemption of various sorts of state law. The rate of acceptance, moreover, has not
diminished (we have taken two more ERISA pre-emption cases so far this Term),
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several cases, the Court developed the basic identifiers of a state law that
“relates to” a benefit plan, primarily focusing on how closely a state law
must relate to a benefit plan to be preempted.59 A law “relates to” a
benefit plan “if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.”60
But the law’s effect on benefit plans may be “too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law ‘relates to’ the
plan.”61 A state law that “produce[s] such acute, albeit indirect,
economic effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to
adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its
choice of insurers an indirect economic effect,” would be preempted.62
These tests require a court to examine the terms of the law and the
practical effect that the law will have on the operation of the plan.63
c. Saving State Insurance Regulation Law from Preemption –
ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A)
Consistent with McCarran-Ferguson’s preference for state
regulation of insurance and the premise that insurance is not its focus,64
suggesting that our prior decisions have not succeeded in bringing clarity to the law.
As he further noted, “applying the ‘relates to’ provision according to its terms was a project doomed
to failure, since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything
else.” Id. at 335. See Acker, supra note 51, at 300 (arguing that federal court jurisdiction to
adjudicate routine, employee welfare benefit plan claims under ERISA should be abolished, except
when federal statutory or regulatory requirements are at issue).
59. ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES, supra note 8, at 33.
60. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97. The Court relied on Black’s Law Dictionary. Id. at 97 n.16
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979) (“Relate. To stand in some relation; to have
bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with”)).
61. Id. at 100 n.21. In Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325, the Court simplified its “relate to”
philosophy: “[w]here a State’s law acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans, as in
Mackey [v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 828 n.2 (1988) (law that
specifically exempted ERISA plans from an otherwise generally applicable garnishment provision)],
or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation, as in [D.C. v. Greater
Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129 (1992) (law “impos[ed] requirements by reference to
[ERISA] covered programs”)] and Ingersoll-Rand [Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990)
(common-law cause of action premised on the existence of an ERISA plan)], that ‘reference’ will
result in pre-emption.” Id. at 324-35.
62. N.Y. State Conf., 514 U.S. at 668 (finding that hospital surcharges were not preempted).
See generally 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 7:33-34 (stating the types of state fair employment practice
laws and state claims for emotional distress that “relate to” an ERISA benefit plan).
63. 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 7:32 (discussing the development of the “relate[s] to” test and
its application). If only a portion of a state statute is preempted, the unaffected portions of the statute
remain. Id.
64. 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 7:14 (noting that “ERISA’s admittedly significant impact on
insurance is . . . primarily indirect,” resulting from the “ever-increasing proportion of the nation’s
life, health, and similar insurance being provided on a group basis as part of the group insured’s
employment benefits”).
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ERISA “saves” state laws that regulate insurance from preemption.65
“State law” has been broadly interpreted, in accordance with ERISA’s
sweeping definition.66
Before Miller, the Court relied on a two-pronged test to determine
whether a state law regulates insurance for ERISA purposes.67 In
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, the Court said that
the state’s mandated benefits law “regulate[ed] the terms of certain
insurance contracts” as a “common-sense view of the matter,” and
therefore saved it from preemption.68 The Court also borrowed the three
factors from the McCarran-Ferguson “business of insurance” test.69
After Miller, the Court released itself from the confines of the
McCarran-Ferguson factors, loosening the tight grip on what is
considered a state insurance regulation.70
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000). “Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in
this title shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.” Id. For an in-depth analysis of the pre-Miller savings
clause test, see Karen A. Jordan, ERISA Pre-Emption: Integrating Fabe into the Savings Clause
Analysis, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 273 (1996) (arguing that a McCarran-Ferguson analysis should be
integrated into the ERISA pre-emption analysis).
66. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c) (2000), supra note 55; see also 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 7:36
(noting that, at the time, the broad definition was offset by the equally narrow interpretation given to
what “regulates insurance”). Whether a state law that addresses insurance as a whole, or some
portion of that business, is preempted depends on the specific activity that is addressed by the law,
the specific type of insurance that is addressed, and the individual court’s view as to the meaning of
the ERISA preemption framework. Id. at § 7:41 (noting that the state laws are too numerous and
diverse to state a single rule on this issue). “Laws governing the traditional activities of insurers . . .
are generally held not to be preempted when addressed to insurers as a class.” Id. Most recent court
decisions have held that common-law breach of contract claims are preempted, id. at § 7:42, and so
far as they are applied to a basic activity connected to an ERISA plan, state tort laws are generally
preempted, id. at § 7:43 (noting that fraud, various types of negligence, wrongful cancellation, and
outrageous conduct have been preempted). Bad faith, emotional distress, and punitive damages
have all been held to be preempted by most of the courts that have heard these claims. Id. at § 7:44
(noting that these claims are preempted as they apply to activity connected to an ERISA plan).
67. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982) (establishing the use of the
three McCarran-Ferguson factors in saving clause analysis); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass.,
471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985) (adopting the “common sense” prong). See 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 7:36
(presenting an overview of the saving clause analysis).
68. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 740 (noting that they were “stat[ing] the obvious” about the
law). See text § IV(c)(2) for an examination of Metropolitan Life’s analysis of the state law.
69. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 742-43 (“The case law concerning the meaning of the
phrase “business of insurance” in the McCarran-Ferguson Act also strongly supports the conclusion
that regulation regarding the substantive terms of insurance contracts falls squarely within the
saving clause as laws “which regulate insurance” (citation omitted)). But see ASHLEY, supra note
45, § 9:17 (arguing that the “business of insurance” and the “regulates insurance” analyses are
fundamentally different).
70. See 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 7:36 for the observation that the broad definition of “state
laws” was tempered by the equally narrow interpretation given to the requirement that the law be
one which regulates insurance before the law was found to be preempted. But “Supreme Court’s
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d. Protecting Self-Insured Employee Benefit Plans – ERISA §
514(b)(2)(B)
To further encourage employers to provide benefit plans to their
employees, Congress limited the states’ ability to regulate those benefit
plans.71 States would not be able to reach the plans by simply
“deeming” them to be insurance companies and then exerting their
In Metropolitan Life, the Court
insurance regulation power.72
distinguished between “insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former
open to indirect regulation while the latter are not.”73 Employers
responded quickly and established self-funded plans to cover their
employees.74
New Savings Clause Test Means More Indirect State Regulation of Self-Funded Plans,” Employer’s
Guide to Self-Insuring Health Benefits, May 2003, available at http://thompson.com/
libraries/benefits/self/samplenews/self0305.html?template=:templates:printfriendly (believing that
instead of clarifying the definition of insurance saved from preemption and minimizing confusion,
the Court has opened a Pandora’s Box, resulting in endless litigation over what states may do under
Miller’s expansive ruling).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2000) reads as follows:
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in [29 USCS § 1003(a)], which is not
exempt under [29 USCS § 1003(b)] (other than a plan established primarily for the
purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be
deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment
company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any
law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks,
trust companies, or investment companies.
Id.
72. Id. See 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 7:35 (discussing self-funded plans). Even if a selfinsured welfare benefit plan specifically stated that it would conform to all “applicable” state laws,
the deemer clause prevents a state from considering these plans to be insurance. Id. See also JOEL L.
MICHAELS, “Overview [State Regulation of TPA and UR Functions],” 2 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE §
23:12 (2003) (discussing the advantages of managed care plans contracting with self-insured
employers to provide many of the features of managed care, while permitting the employer to retain
the advantages of self-insurance). But see Dennis K. Schaeffer, Comment, Insuring the Protection
of ERISA Plan Participants: ERISA Preemption and the Federal Government’s Duty to Regulate
Self-Insured Health Plans, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1085 (1999) (arguing that the federal government has a
duty to compensate for the lack of any regulation of self-insured health plans through
comprehensive and reasonable regulation of employee welfare benefit plans, a responsibility that
ERISA has prevented the states from assuming).
73. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747. While there is a split in judicial opinion, most courts
hold that an employer’s purchase of “stop-loss” insurance does not deprive an otherwise selfinsured plan of its protection under the deemer clause. 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 7:35 (noting that a
minority of courts have found to the contrary).
74. See ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES, supra note 8, at 9-14 (estimating that in 1993,
nearly half of plan participants (44 million) were enrolled in self-funded health plans, up from about
one-quarter in 1968). Many self-insured employers purchase stop-loss or stop-gap insurance to
cover extraordinary expenses above and beyond a particular level. Id. The circuits are split over
whether states may regulate the stop-loss insurance that employers purchase for their self-insured
plans. See Troy Paredes, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining the Scope of
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B. The Fight for Quality Health Care
1. The Overlap between Contract and Tort
For plan participants and beneficiaries,75 ERISA provides exclusive
civil remedies.76 The type of cause of action that seeks damages from a
managed care company and/or its contracting medical groups and
doctors determines a plaintiff’s possibility of success.77 Claims subject
to ERISA preemption78 are limited to an uphill battle with a contract
claim,79 where the remedies are limited to recovery of the benefits
owed.80 Federal law does not deter employers and plan administrators
Federal Preemption, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 233 (1997) (arguing that ERISA should not be
construed to preempt states from enforcing their insurance laws against a stop-loss plan’s insurer).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (2000) (defining “participant” as an “employee or former employee
of an employer. . .who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit”). A former employee with
either a “reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment” or a “colorable claim to
vested benefits” may be a participant. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
See also Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, Construction and Application of Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 et seq.) by U.S. Supreme Court, 150 A.L.R. Fed.
441 § 24 (1998). 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (2000) (defining “beneficiary” as a “person designated by a
participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit
thereunder”).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000). See text § II(A)(2)(a) and notes 40-51.
77. Sharon J. Arkin, Tort Actions Against Health Maintenance Organizations and Their
Doctors, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 609, 609-12 (2002) (highlighting the importance that the choice of
legal theory has on a plaintiff participant).
78. See generally 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 7:34 (describing the types of state-law claims for
emotional distress that have been preempted because they “relate to” an ERISA benefit plan). When
the act which allegedly gave rise to the emotional distress claim is itself related to the benefit plan in
any significant respect, these claims have been preempted. Id. Claims related to denial or processing
of claims, misrepresenting that expenses would be covered under the plan, reduction and
termination of benefits under the ERISA plan, terminating employment in order to terminate
benefits or in retaliation for having discovered ERISA violations, and improper refusal to convert a
group policy to individual coverage have all been preempted. Id. See also Steele & Saue, supra note
45, § 14:18 (noting that some of ERISA’s most important parts as applied to employee benefit plans
are the preemption provisions).
79. Arkin, supra note 77, at 609-10 (presenting alternative avenues with which a plaintiff may
seek to extract his or her case from the strict limitations of ERISA). She also notes that without
these alternatives, a plaintiff’s “claim is reduced to what is essentially a contract claim—with all the
cards stacked against” him or her. Id at 610.
80. Id. at 612 (noting that consequential damages, emotional distress damages, and punitive
damages are not recoverable). No matter how egregious the provider’s misconduct, the plan still
will be subject only to ERISA’s limited liabilities. Id at 611-12. See also TERRY O. TOTTENHAM,
“ERISA and HMO Liability,” 1 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE § 9:68 (2003) (discussing state medical
malpractice claims against HMOs); Paula A. Nelson, Note, Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux: The
Supreme Court’s Federalization of Employee Benefit Law, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 507 (1988) (Pilot
Life stands for the proposition that no extra-contractual damages are available in a suit by a
participant or beneficiary against an insurance carrier which processes claims or makes benefit
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from denying claims in bad faith81 because ERISA does not authorize
any other legal or equitable relief82 outside of recovery of the benefit due
under the plan.83 The difference between a tort claim and a contract
claim also has significant ramifications for a plaintiff.84 Recovering in
contract law85 instead of tort law86 severely restricts a patient’s potential
and actual damages.87 However, as more Americans are covered by
determinations).
81. Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants’ Rights by
Expanding the Federal Common Law of ERISA, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 671, 671 (1994) (exploring the
current boundaries of the federal common law of ERISA and urging the expansion of these
boundaries to protect plan participants who have been betrayed without a remedy). See 1 COUCH,
supra note 8, § 7:15 (mentioning the simultaneous reduction of an insurer’s incentive to behave
reasonably and a wronged insured’s ability to enforce their ERISA rights).
82. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000). “Congress attempted to preserve the states’ traditional
role as the primary regulators of insurance companies” when they enacted ERISA. See ASHLEY,
supra note 45, § 9:17. The regulation of group health insurance claim settlement practices should
have been kept safely outside the reach of the federal courts. Id. However, in Pilot Life, the
“Supreme Court demonstrated the wisdom of Congress’ allocation of authority by unanimously
misinterpreting the very provision by which Congress had intended to save the states’ power to
define the insurer’s role in adjusting claims.” ASHLEY, supra, § 9:17.
83. Zanglein, supra note 81, at 671 (noting that insurance companies have little incentive
under current state or federal law to pay, in good faith, disputed medical or pension benefit claims).
Those claims preempted by ERISA because they “relate to” an employee benefit plan are: state law
improper denial of a claim, state law misrepresentation, breach of contract, negligence, emotional
distress, outrageous and fraudulent denial of coverage, unfair insurance practices, tortious
interference, and bad faith. Id. at 671-72. Such preemption would be logical if ERISA provided a
remedy sufficient to deter bad faith claims denial and fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. at 671. But
see ASHLEY, supra note 45, § 9:17 (noting that while ERISA does not provide plaintiffs the
generous relief available to them under the common law of bad faith, it does provide some
possibilities for recovering damages beyond mere policy proceeds, including damages not available
in common law bad faith cases).
84. See PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE
MANAGED CARE ERA, Oxford University Press, 108-114 (2002) (describing the differences
between tort and contract claims, and the resulting impact on health care claims).
85. Id. at 105. The most likely remedy for a breach of contract involves awarding damages to
compensate an injured party for a loss (legal relief), but a court may require specific performance of
the contract (equitable relief), which in a health care context, means that a plan would be required to
provide a benefit that was denied. Id at 107. Punitive damages, which are designed to punish the
offending party and to deter similar conduct in the future, and exemplary damages, which are
reserved for cases where the defendant’s conduct is tantamount to fraud, malice, or oppression, are
available for breach of contract in a small number of jurisdictions. Id.
86. Id. at 103. State courts usually resolve litigation between patients and physicians or
hospitals over medical injuries. Id. Under agency and vicarious liability principles, an MCO may be
indirectly liable for malpractice committed by independent contractor physicians. Id. Utilizationreview arrangements that allow an MCO to override a physician’s clinical judgment are good
indicia of whether an MCO has sufficient control over the physician. Id. at 104. The question is
whether and how courts will apply these principles to the ever-morphing managed care
organizational forms and cost-containment innovations, both within and outside of the ERISA
context. Id. at 103.
87. Id. at 98. Contract damage awards tend to be more limited, as pain and suffering are more
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ERISA plans,88 which are immune from state laws that relate to these
benefit plans,89 the chances that a patient will be able to recover in tort
are less likely.90 Percolating behind much of this debate is the fight for
patients’ rights.91

difficult to get than in a negligence action. Id. Unequal bargaining power between plan and patient
and the contract language may result in a more difficult challenge of delayed or denied health care
under a contract theory because the plan contract may eliminate the possibility of individual
challenges. Id.
88. In 1995, the General Accounting Office estimated that 114 million individuals, or 44
percent of the US population, were covered by an ERISA health plan. ISSUES, TRENDS, AND
CHALLENGES, supra note 8, at 2. In 2001, an estimated 129 million Americans receive health
insurance through their employer. ERISA Hearing, supra note 13, at 2 (Rep. Sam Johnson, Member,
House Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations). Over eighty percent of U.S. workers are
covered by ERISA. Id.
89. See text § II(A)(2)(b) and notes 52-63. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
90. JACOBSON, supra note 84, at 98. The hybrid nature of managed care requires a new
governing approach as the current legal rules were designed to respond to a system with separate
financing and care-giving functions. Id. at 99. When contracts dominate the legal rules, large
institutions, such as MCOs, wield their superior bargaining power during the contract-writing
process to create favorable situations for them. Id. This market-based contract approach fails to
protect patients when MCOs can avoid responsibility for adverse medical outcomes. Id. To that
extent, government oversight and the regulatory functions of the tort system serve as deterrents and
potential correctives to the market’s excesses. Id. at 98-99.
91. See Matthew J. Binette, Comment, Patients’ Bill of Rights: Legislative Cure-All or
Prescription for Disaster?, 81 N.C. L. REV. 653, 657-58 (2003) (concluding that Congressional
action is necessary to alleviate the confusion caused by overlapping state and federal judicial action
on the issue of ERISA preemption and managed care liability, but that Congress should take a
moderate approach); Sylvia A. Law, Do We Still Need a Federal Patients’ Bill of Rights?, 3 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 1 (2002) (despite the leeway for state remedies following Pegram and
Moran, a federal patients’ bill of rights is necessary); Ann H. Nevers, ERISA Right to Sue: An Rx for
Health Care that Places Forum over Substantive Consumer Rights, 31 N.M. L. REV. 493, 493
(2001) (real reform lies in protecting substantive consumer rights through a variety of forums and
providing for adequate redress for harm in whichever forum relief is sought); Eric M. Eusanio,
Comment, Control, Quality, and Cost: The Need for Federal Legislation Amending ERISA’s
Failure to Protect Consumers from Liability-Free MCOs, 7 J.L. & POL’Y 627 (1999) (arguing for
federal legislation to cure the defects in the private sector employer-provided health care market);
Deborah S. Davidson, Note, Balancing the Interests of State Health Care Reform and Uniform
Employee Benefit Laws Under ERISA: A “Uniform Patient Protection Act,” 53 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 203, 206 (1998) (proposes a Uniform Patient Protection Act and an amendment to
ERISA that brings self-insured plans within the Uniform Act’s provisions). But see, e.g., Edward A.
Zelinsky, Against a Federal Patients’ Bill of Rights, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 443 (2003) (finding
no justification for a Patients’ Bill of Rights, which is just a response to a nonexistent problem,
because ERISA did not create a regulatory gap); Wendy K. Mariner, Standards of Care and
Standard Form Contracts: Distinguishing Patient Rights and Consumer Rights in Managed Care,
15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (1998) (distinguishing between patient rights and consumer
rights and suggesting that managed care plans be viewed as a hybrid incorporating elements of
standard form insurance contracts and elements of professional service agreements for personal
medical care traditionally governed by tort standards).
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2. “Any Willing Provider” Laws
An HMO arrangement turns the traditional fee-for-service upsidedown.92 Instead of the patient directly paying the independent health
care provider, under an HMO arrangement, the patient pays a
prearranged fixed fee to the HMO.93 In return, the HMO bears the
responsibility for arranging the care provided for the patient and paying
for those services.94 One way that health care providers have devised to
control health care costs is “selective contracting,” where the MCO
selects a limited number of a health care providers to provide services to
the MCO’s membership in return for a reduced cost to the MCO.95
While theoretically reducing the costs of health care,96 such methods
have caused substantial consumer dissatisfaction and discussion over the
perceived ills of managed care.97
One response to managed care restrictions is “any willing provider”
law.98 While there are variations among them, the basic AWP law
allows health care providers (usually physicians but also pharmacies)
92. Diana Joseph Bearden and Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability in the
Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 285, 287 (1995) (providing an overview of the
various theories of liability that have been pursued against managed care organizations).
93. Id. at 291.
94. Id.
95. James W. Childs, Jr., Comment, You May Be Willing, But Are You Able?: A Critical
Analysis of “Any Willing Provider” Legislation, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 199, 207 (1997). “Providers are
essentially guaranteed a steady volume of patients because the MCO will contract with only a select
few providers.” Id.
96. Id. (noting that selective contracting is the one of the most successful methods that health
care providers have created to control health care costs).
97. Larry J. Pittman, “Any Willing Provider” Laws and ERISA’s Savings Clause: A New
Solution for an Old Problem, 64 TENN. L. REV. 409, 416 (1997). Barry R. Furrow describes the
concern over managed care as follows:
Some groups fear this evolution within the health care system. They worry that managed
care organizations will limit physician options and harm patients through systematic
cost-cutting. They foresee cookbook medicine through imposed practice guidelines;
bureaucratic controls through utilization review; and dissipation of physician-patient
trust as a result. They fear that profound inequality within our health care system will
result from any “rush” toward efficiency-based medicine. Primarily, however, they fear a
corporatization of health care. Under such corporatization, they fear, doctors will come
to resemble little more than production workers in a medical version of the assembly
line, with corporate management tools and statistical process analysis micromanaging
physician work.
Barry R. Furrow, Incentivizing Medical Practice: What (If Anything) Happens to Professionalism?,
1 WID. L. SYMP. J. 1, 3-4 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
98. Approximately half of the states have some form of AWP laws, with most (twenty) of
those laws relating to pharmacies and pharmacists. Sara Hoffman Jurand, High Court Ruling on
ERISA Is Another Blow to HMOs, TRIAL, June 2003, available at WL 39-JUN JTLATRIAL 17.
Seven have AWP laws that apply to doctors. Id.
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who have been denied access to a managed care network the opportunity
to “opt in” to the network.99 At work behind the AWP debate were two
competing public policies: an individual’s right to choose a medical
provider and the need to reduce health care costs.100 There are non-cost
related benefits to such laws, such as stronger doctor-patient
relationships and improved patient continuity of care when employers
change insurance plans.101 Balanced against broad access is the overall
ability of the market to provide basic, affordable coverage, which lies at
the root of the country’s health care crisis.102 HMOs also argue that such
laws force them to carry excessive administrative costs while restricting
their ability to ferret out questionable providers.103 The consensus is that
AWP laws drive up the cost of health care, erasing whatever reductions
managed care was able to achieve using limited networks.104 Before
99. Andrew L. Jiranek & Susan Baker, Any Willing Provider Laws, 28 MD. BAR J. 27, 27
(1995). There are three basic categories of AWP laws. The first is “freedom of choice,” where
insurers are required to reimburse a non-network provider if the provider agrees to accept the
insurer’s level of reimbursement for the service. Id. The second is “mandatory admittance,” which
requires insurers to include in the network any provider willing to abide by the terms and conditions
of the network. Id. Kentucky’s AWP law falls in this second category. The third category is “due
process,” which requires insurers to follow certain procedures in establishing and maintaining their
network. Id.
100. Dianne McCarthy, Note, Narrowing Provider Choice: Any Willing Provider Laws After
New York Blue Cross v. Travelers, 23 AMER. J.L. & MED. 97, 97 (1997).
101. Laura B. Benko, Willing and Able: Supreme Court Ruling Forces HMOs to Open
Networks to Any Willing Provider, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Apr. 7, 2003, at 6 (statement by Andrew
Pulito, Ky. Med. Ass’n). Without AWP laws, the employees of an employer who changed insurance
plans would be forced to go to a provider on the employer’s approved list, which may or may not
include the employee’s present provider. Id. If the provider was not on the list, an employee may
have had the option of paying out-of-pocket to continue to see that particular provider, but under
AWP laws, the particular provider need only join the new network. Id. AWP laws especially help
patients in rural areas or small towns, where healthcare choices are limited. Id. (statement by Carol
Ormay, Ky. Hospital Ass’n). Without the ability to see out-of-network providers in their small
towns, many rural Kentuckians were forced to travel several hours to see an in-network provider.
Id.
102. Id. (statement by Melodie Shrader, Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans) (“[t]he problem with our
healthcare system is that we’re told, ‘You have to buy a Cadillac or you can’t drive’”).
103. Id. (statement by Don Young, Health Ins. Ass’n of America). AWP laws add
requirements to the HMO’s responsibility, in addition to state mandates governing network
structure, claims payment, external review, and required benefits. Id.
104. See Jill A. Marsteller et al, The Resurgence of Selective Contracting Restrictions, 22 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1133 (1997) (providing an analytical conclusion based on statistics and
categorization, but not limited to AWP laws); William J. Bahr, Comment, Although Offering More
Freedom to Choose, “Any Willing Provider” Legislation Is the Wrong Choice, 45 U. KAN. L. REV.
557, 590 (1997) (concluding that AWP laws are not the answer to health care problems, “but an
avenue to reach the most beneficial solution”); Gary A. Francesconi, Note, ERISA Preemption of
“Any Willing Provider” Laws – An Essential Step Toward National Health Care Reform, 73 WASH.
U. L.Q. 227 (1995) (arguing that AWP laws should be preempted by ERISA because they are
“health laws,” not “insurance laws”).
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Miller, many commentators agreed with the circuit courts that held that
ERISA preempted AWP laws.105
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts and Procedural History
The Kentucky General Assembly enacted an “Any Willing
Provider” provision in 1994,106 followed by a chiropractor-specific law
two years later.107 The plaintiffs were several health maintenance
105. See Alice T. Armstrong, Comment, ERISA Preemption of “Any Willing Provider”: Why
the Eighth Circuit Got It Right, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 753 (1999) (even under the narrow
preemptive reach following Travelers, AWP laws do not survive ERISA preemption); Theodore
Einhorn, Note, Reigning in ERISA Preemption? Any Willing Provider Statutes After New York
Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 265 (1996) (the
Supreme Court’s limitation of Travelers regarding “indirect economic effects” leaves questions as
to state regulation of health care, which the Court will need to address in the future). But see
Colleen C. Donnelly, Note, CIGNA Healthplan of Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana: Unwilling to Save
Louisiana’s Any Willing Provider Statute from ERISA Preemption, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1255 (1997)
(arguing that the Fifth Circuit should have followed Travelers’ narrowing of ERISA preemption and
saved Louisiana’s AWP law).
106. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 227 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2000). KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-110(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1995) states that “Health care benefit plans shall not
discriminate against any provider who is located within the geographic coverage area of the health
benefit plan and is willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation established by the
health benefit plan.” Id. A “health benefit plan” was defined as:
[Any] hospital or medical expense policy or certificate; nonprofit hospital, medicalsurgical, and health service corporation contract or certificate; a self-insured plan or a
plan provided by a multiple employer welfare arrangement, to the extent permitted by
ERIS; health maintenance organization contract; and standard and supplemental health
benefit plan as established in KRS 304.17A-160.
Miller, 227 F.3d at 355. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-100(4) (Banks-Baldwin 1995).
Effective July 1, 1999, §§ 304.17A-110(3) and 304.17A-100(4) were repealed. Miller, 227 F.3d at
356. The Kentucky General Assembly reenacted the provision by substituting the term “health
insurer” for “health benefit plan” and keeping the rest of the provision, which was codified at KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-270 (Banks-Baldwin). Id. The definition of “insurer” was codified at
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-005(22) (Banks-Baldwin 1999). Id. “Insurer” is defined as:
Any insurance company; health maintenance organization; self-insurer or multiple
employer welfare arrangement not exempt from state regulation by ERISA; providersponsored integrated health delivery network; self-insured employer-organized
association, or nonprofit hospital, medical-surgical, dental, or health service corporation
authorized to transact health insurance business in Kentucky.
Id. The Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court analyzed the statute’s present form rather than the
repealed versions. Miller, 227 F.3d at 356.
107. Id. at 355. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-171 (Banks-Baldwin 1999). § 171 imposed
eight requirements on health benefit plans that include chiropractic benefits, but the Sixth Circuit
only ruled on § 304.17A-171(2), the “any willing provider” provision, which states:
A health benefit plan that includes chiropractic benefits shall: . . . (2) Permit any licensed
chiropractor who agrees to abide by the terms, conditions, reimbursement rates, and
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organizations (HMOs) and a Kentucky-based association of HMOs.108
To control the quality and cost of health care delivery, the petitioners
created exclusive “provider networks” with selectively-chosen doctors,
hospitals, and other health care providers.109 The contract between the
HMO and these “participating providers” required the providers to
charge discounted rates for health care services to the HMO’s
subscribers.110 Limited access to providers was the HMO’s way of
controlling the cost to its subscribers.111
standards of quality of the health benefit plan to serve as a participating primary
chiropractic provider to any person covered by the plan.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17 A-171 (A). Miller, 227 F.3d at 355 n.2. The Sixth Circuit
remanded the issue of preemption of the seven remaining provisions, § 304.17A.-171(1) and (3)-(8),
for consideration by the district court because the district court “apparently limited its analysis to
Kentucky’s ‘Any Willing Provider’ provisions,” including § 304.17A-110(3) and § 304.17A171(2), and “never explicitly addressed” the remaining seven provisions. Id at 355 n.3. The
remaining provisions required health benefit plans that included chiropractic benefits to:
include all primary chiropractic providers who are selected by a person covered by the
plan; allow participants direct access to chiropractors of their choice without referral
from a gatekeeper; appoint a chiropractor as a gatekeeper for the provision of
chiropractic services when the plan uses gatekeepers; refrain from discriminating in
reimbursement rates between chiropractors; refrain from promoting or recommending
any chiropractor to a covered person; assure adequate numbers of providers are included
in the plan; and make listings of participating chiropractors available to covered persons
on a regular basis.
Id. at 355 n.3. All of the chiropractor provisions remained intact when the legislature repealed the
health benefit plan statutes in 1998. Id. at 356. § 304.17A-110(3) and § 304.17A-171(2) will be
referred to collectively as Kentucky’s “AWP” laws, unless specifically cited.
108. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 332 (2003). Two of the original
seven plaintiffs, Advantage Care, Inc. and FHP of Ohio, Inc., did not join in the petition for writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v.
Miller, 2001 WL 34125415 (2001) (No. 00-1471). The Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc.
is a non-profit association established to promote its members’ business interest. Miller, 227 F.3d at
355.
109. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 2002 WL 31128122
(2002) (No. 00-1471).
110. Id. at 1-2. In exchange for their rate discount, participating providers received the
advantage of access to the HMO’s subscribers and, hence, increased patient volume over nonnetwork providers lacking such access. Id.
111. Id. at 3 (citing ROBERT G. SHOULDICE, INTRODUCTION TO MANAGED CARE 72 (1991)).
The HMOs argued that the fewer the providers, the greater the patient volume for each provider. Id.
They also argued that the AWP laws were designed to require them to “throw open their closed
provider networks to any provider in the geographic area willing to abide by the terms of their
network contracts.” Id. at 4. An HMO controls cost and quality by deciding for itself which
providers will be included in the network, and, the petitioners contended, “the unavoidable
consequence of the laws is to drive up the costs of the health care services managed by HMOs and
to affect their ability to regulate efficiently the quality of care offered by network providers.” Id. at
4-5. The petitioners contended that the consumers would ultimately be denied the benefit of these
cost-reducing arrangements. Miller, 538 U.S. at 332. For a discussion of the shortcomings of AWP
laws as well as the inefficiencies of the free market in the health care industry, see Christine C.
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The plaintiffs filed suit against the Commissioner of the Kentucky
Department of Insurance112 in the Eastern District of Kentucky in April
1997, requesting that the AWP laws be declared preempted by § 514(a)
of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).113 Both parties moved for partial
summary judgment.114 The district court granted partial summary
judgment in favor of the Commissioner, ruling that while the AWP laws
were related to employee benefit plans under ERISA,115 they were saved
from preemption through ERISA’s saving clause116 because they
regulated the business of insurance.117 The plaintiffs appealed this
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.118
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment with respect to the AWP statute119 and the chiropractic AWP
statute,120 but remanded the additional provisions in the chiropractic
statute for the district court to decide if they were preempted by
ERISA.121 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that the AWP

Dodd, Comment, The Exclusion of Non-Physician Health-Care Providers from Integrated Delivery
Systems: Group Boycott or Legitimate Business Practice?, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 983, 1025 (1996)
(concluding that AWP laws are too broad to have any meaningful change in the market). For a
comprehensive nationwide overview of state selective contracting laws, see Jill A. Marsteller, et al.,
The Resurgence of Selective Contracting Restrictions, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1133 (1997).
112. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 227 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2000). At the time
of the filing, George Nichols held this position, and he was named the defendant in his official
capacity. Id. Following the Sixth Circuit’s decision, Janie Miller succeeded Nichols as
Commissioner, and she was substituted as respondent beginning with the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii, 2001 WL 34125415 (2001) (No. 00-1471).
113. Miller, 227 F.3d at 356.
114. Id.
115. Miller, 227 F.3d at 356-57 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), the preemption clause, supra note
12).
116. Id. at 357 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), the savings clause, supra note 13).
117. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 227 F.3d 352, 356 (6th Cir. 2000). The district
judge also determined the order to be final and appealable. Id. Plaintiffs then appealed. Id.
Community Health Partners, Inc. filed suit challenging Kentucky’s AWP laws in December 1996 in
the Western District of Kentucky. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6 n.3, 2001 WL 34125415
(2001) (No. 00-1471). Plaintiff in that suit, Community Health Partners, Inc. v. Ky. ex rel. Nichols,
14 F. Supp. 2d 991 (W.D. Ky. 1998), also appealed, and the same Sixth Circuit panel heard separate
arguments for both of the cases. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6 n.3, 2001 WL 34125415 (2001)
(No. 00-1471). The Court incorporated its full majority and dissenting opinions into its Community
Health Partners decision. Id. Community Health Partners’ petition for certiorari was unanimously
denied by the Supreme Court on the day that it reached its decision in Miller, April 7, 2003.
Community Health Partners, Inc. v. Ky., 538 U.S. 960, 960 (2003).
118. Miller, 227 F.3d at 356.
119. Id. at 372. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-270 (Banks-Baldwin 1999).
120. Miller, 227 F.3d at 372. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-171(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1999).
121. Miller, 227 F.3d at 372. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-171(1) and (3)-(8). (BanksBaldwin 1999). See supra note 106.
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laws “regulat[ed] insurance” and fell within ERISA’s savings clause.122
The court of appeals first determined that the AWP provisions “relate[d]
to” an employee benefit plan for purposes of ERISA § 514(a).123 The
court then held that the AWP laws were saved from preemption because
they were “specifically directed toward ‘insurers’ and the insurance
industry and [were] ones that from a ‘common sense view’ regulate[d]
insurance.”124 In considering the three McCarran-Ferguson factors,125 the
122. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 227 F.3d 352, 372 (6th Cir. 2000).
123. The court of appeals found that the AWP provisions “relate[d] to” employee benefits
plans under both prongs of the test that the Supreme Court established in Cal. Div. of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N. A., Inc.: “a law ‘relates to’ a covered
employee benefit plan for purposes of § 514(a) if it [1] has a connection with or [2] reference to
such plan.” 519 U.S. 316, 324 (1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). If a law relates to
a covered employee benefit plan, then ERISA preempts it, “unless [they are] found to be statutes
that regulate insurance under the savings clause, § 514(b)(2)(A).” Miller, 227 F.3d at 363.
124. Miller, 227 F.3d at 366. The court of appeals felt that even though the laws included
HMOs and traditional insurance companies within its reach, the laws could still fall within the
state’s right to regulate insurance. Id. at 364. The court agreed with the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit in Washington Physicians Service Association v. Gregoire, 147 F.3d 1039, 1045-46 (9th Cir.
1998):
The Washington law is “specifically directed” toward the insurance industry [ ] because
it operates directly on HMOs and HCSCs, entities that are engaged in the business of
health insurance. “The primary elements of an insurance contract are the spreading and
underwriting of a policyholder’s risk.” [ ] The only distinction between an HMO (or
HCSC) and a traditional insurer is that the HMO provides medical services directly,
while a traditional insurer does so indirectly by paying for the service, [ ] but this is a
distinction without a difference. [ ] In the end, HMOs function the same way as a
traditional health insurer: The policyholder pays a fee for a promise of medical services
in the event that he should need them. It follows that HMOs (and HCSCs) are in the
business of insurance.
Miller, 227 F.3d at 364-65 (internal citations omitted). The court also agreed with the Seventh
Circuit’s reasoning that “because HMOs spread risk – both across patients and over time for any
given person – they are ‘insurance vehicles’ under” Kentucky law. Id. at 365 (citing Anderson v.
Humana, Inc., 24 F.3d 889, 892 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Because ERISA’s “deemer” clause does not protect certain self-insured health care benefit
plans that are excluded from ERISA coverage under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b), e.g. self-insured
government plans and self-insured church plans, the court acknowledged that Kentucky’s statutes
would reach these plans. Miller, 227 F.3d at 365. The court did “not see this fact, however, as any
barrier to a finding that a common sense view is that the statutes regulate insurance.” Id. The court
saw no reason why States do not have the authority to include entities that act as self-insurers within
their laws dealing with insurance. Id. Recognizing that courts and legislatures struggle over whether
self-insurers should be the equivalent of an insurer, citing 1 COUCH, supra note 8, § 10:2, the court
noted that states bypass this difficulty by “express statutory provisions specifying that a particular
requirement does or does not apply to self-insured entities.” Miller, 227 F.3d at 365. Kentucky has
followed this direction by including self-insurers, to the extent permitted by ERISA, within the
statute, which is codified in Kentucky’s Insurance Code. Id.
The court also focused on the relationship between insurers and insureds under health
benefit plans, holding that Kentucky’s AWP laws:
[A]ffect restrictions by the insurers on the number of health care providers available to
the insureds under such plans; they increase benefits to the insureds by giving them
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court of appeals found that all three applied to the Kentucky AWP
laws.126 The plaintiffs filed for, and were granted, a writ of certiorari by
the United States Supreme Court.127
B. Supreme Court Decision
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a unanimous opinion affirming the
Sixth Circuit’s decision.128 The Court noted that their prior decisions
construing the savings clause have relied on their cases interpreting two
subsections of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.129 This use of the McCarranFerguson case law in the ERISA context “has misdirected attention,
failed to provide clear guidance to lower federal courts, and, as this case
demonstrates, added little to the relevant analysis.”130 The Court stated
greater freedom to choose health care providers under the plans; and they are aimed at
regulating this insurance relationship.
Id. at 368.
125. See text supra § II(A)(1). The appellate court noted that the McCarran-Ferguson factors
are “checking points” or “guideposts” because they are of secondary importance and not essential
elements. Miller, 227 F.3d at 364.
126. Miller, 538 U.S. at 333.
127. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 536 U.S. 956 (2002) (granting writ of
certiorari). The petitioners contended in the petition that the Sixth Circuit’s decision exacerbated
conflicts in the federal circuits over whether AWP statutes are laws which regulate insurance.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Miller, at 2-3, 2001 WL 34125415 (2001) (No. 00-1471). Compare
Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Mgmt., 995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that
Virginia’s statute, which prohibited insurers and benefit plan administrators from entering into
exclusive contracts with preferred providers, related to ERISA employee benefit plans but was
saved from pre-emption because it regulates insurance as a matter of common sense); with
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Nat’l Park Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the Arkansas law, which was “almost identical” to Kentucky’s AWP law, failed both the common
sense test and all three McCarran-Ferguson factors, and therefore was not saved from pre-emption
by ERISA); and Cigna Healthplan v. La., 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a Louisiana
AWP law that mandated that a licensed provider who agreed to the terms and conditions of the
preferred provider contract shall not be denied the right to become a preferred provider was not a
law which regulated insurance because the laws were not limited to entities within the insurance
industry and it applied not only to insurers, but also to self-funded organizations, Taft-Hartley trusts,
or employers who establish or participate in self-funded trusts or programs, as well as health care
financiers, third party administrators, providers or other intermediaries).
128. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 342 (2003).
129. Id. at 339. McCarran-Ferguson Act §§ 2(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1012.
130. Miller, 538 U.S. at 340 (declaring that it was unsurprised by this result since the statutory
language of the savings clause differs substantially from the McCarran-Ferguson Act). The
McCarran-Ferguson Act concerns itself with whether certain practices constitute “[t]he business of
insurance,” 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a), or whether a state law was “enacted . . . for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance,” 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (emphasis added). The savings clause,
on the other hand, asks merely whether a state law is a “law . . . which regulates insurance, banking,
or securities.” Id. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). In addition, the McCarran-Ferguson factors were
developed in cases that characterized conduct by private actors, not state laws. Id. (referring to
Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982), and Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
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that when it held in UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward131 and Rush
Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran132 that the state law may fail the first
McCarran-Ferguson factor yet still be saved from pre-emption by the
savings clause, it created more questions than answers and provided
wide opportunities for divergent outcomes.133 Because it had never held
that the McCarran-Ferguson factors were essential to a savings clause
inquiry,134 the Court chose to make a clean break from them for that
analysis.135 For a state law to be deemed a “law . . . which regulates
insurance” under the savings clause, it must satisfy two requirements:
(1) the state law must be directed specifically directed toward entities
engaged in insurance, and (2) the state law must substantially affect the
risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured.136
Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 210 (1979)).
131. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
132. Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
133. Miller, 538 U.S. at 340 (questioning whether a state law that satisfied any two of the
factors could still fall under the savings clause or asking what happens if two factors are satisfied,
but not “securely satisfied” or “clearly satisfied,” as in Ward and Moran). The Court acknowledged
that there is even more confusion with whether the state law itself or the conduct regulated by that
law is the proper subject to which the McCarran-Ferguson factors are applied. Id. (emphasis in
original). See ASHLEY, supra note 45, § 9:17 (concluding that the only real connection between the
McCarran-Ferguson “business of insurance” phrase and the ERISA “law . . . which regulates
insurance” savings clause phrase is the word “insurance,” and that this is hardly a compelling reason
to impose an interpretation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act on different language in ERISA).
134. Miller, 538 U.S. at 341 (recalling its prior decisions that referred to the McCarranFerguson factors as “considerations [to be] weighed” in determining whether a state law falls under
the savings clause or “checking points” to be used after determining whether the state law regulates
insurance from a “common-sense” understanding” or “guideposts” to “confirm our conclusion” that
the state statute regulated insurance).
In oral arguments, Justice Scalia said that he did not like the common-sense, “I know it
when I see it,” test. Transcript, U.S.S. Ct. at 41, 2003 WL 145394 (2003) (No. 00-1471). He
worried that the Court would “approve those things that we like, and disapprove those things that
we don’t like . . . I don’t trust common sense.” Id. Instead of the common-sense test, Justice Scalia
wanted “some rule of law that [he] could adhere to.” Id. at 42. Justice Ginsburg highlighted that
difficulty with the common-sense test, when she said,
I read the Sixth Circuit opinion, I said, yes, that makes common sense, and I read Judge
Kennedy’s dissenting opinion and said, yes, that’s common sense, too . . . These are
rational judges on both sides, they both made good arguments, and they both conformed
to some sense of what goes on in the real world, so what is the common sense test?
Id. at 37.
135. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341 (2003). But see ASHLEY,
supra note 45, § 9:17 (noting the fundamental discrepancy between the McCarran-Ferguson
“business of insurance” analysis and the purposes of ERISA’s savings clause). Ashley contends that
the McCarran-Ferguson test should be reformulated to fit ERISA cases within the analysis of the
phrase “business of insurance”: “(1) Does the law regulate the transferring or spreading of the risk?
(2) Does the law regulate an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured? (3) Is the law’s scope limited to entities within the insurance industry?” Id.
136. Miller, 538 U.S. at 342.
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1. Specifically Directed Toward Entities Engaged in Insurance
The Court found that the AWP laws “regulated” insurance by
imposing conditions on the right to engage in the business of
insurance.137 The Court first reiterated that ERISA’s savings clause only
saves a state law that is “specifically directed toward” the insurance
industry that regulates an insurance practice.138 Addressing the
petitioners’ first claim, the Court held that Kentucky did not fail to
specifically direct its AWP laws toward the insurance industry simply
because the laws restricted the actions of providers and insurers
equally.139 Nor do the laws lose their specificity when one of their
consequences is that entities outside of the insurance industry will be
unable to enter into certain agreements with Kentucky insurers.140 The
savings clause only requires a law to be one “which regulates
insurance”.141
137. Id. at 333 (only mentioning the court of appeals’ finding that the AWP statutes “relate to”
employee benefit plans under § 1144(a) as part of the procedural history, and not in the discussion
section).
138. Miller, 538 U.S. at 334 (citing Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 366
(2002)). Laws of general application that have some bearing on insurers do not qualify. Id. (citing
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987)). The petitioners contended that the AWP
laws fell outside the scope of the savings clause for two reasons: (1) Kentucky failed to “specifically
direc[t]” its AWP laws towards the insurance industry and (2) the AWP laws did not regulate an
insurance practice. Id.
139. Miller, 538 U.S. at 334 (noting that providers are prevented from entering into limited
network contracts, and insurers are prevented from creating exclusive networks). The Court also
stated that neither of the AWP statutes imposed any prohibition or requirement on health-care
providers, and that Kentucky health-care providers are able to enter exclusive networks with
insurers who conduct business outside Kentucky or who are otherwise not covered by the AWP
statutes. Id. at 335. Only when a “health insurer” or “health benefit plan that includes chiropractic
benefits” excludes a provider who is willing and able to meet its terms is the particular AWP statute
violated. Id.
140. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 335 (2003) (stating that similar
consequences resulted from state laws that were saved from pre-emption in FMC Corp. v. Holliday,
498 U.S. 52 (1990), and Rush Prudential). In FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 55 n.1, Pennsylvania
prohibited insurers from exercising subrogation rights against an insured’s tort recovery and
prevented insureds from entering into enforceable contracts with insurers allowing subrogation.
Miller, 538 U.S. at 335. In Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 372, Illinois required HMOs to provide
independent review of whether services were “medically necessary,” and likewise excluded
insureds from joining an HMO that would have withheld the right to independent review in
exchange for a lower premium. Miller, 538 U.S. at 335. Even though the effect of those laws on
noninsurers may have been significant, the Court found that the effect of the laws was not
inconsistent with the requirement that they be “specifically directed toward” the insurance industry.
Id. Regulations “directed toward” certain entities will almost always disable other entities from
doing, with the regulated entities, what the regulations forbid; this does not suffice to place such
regulation outside the scope of the savings clause. Id.
141. Miller, 538 U.S. at 336 n.1 (emphasis added in opinion) (distinguishing the savings clause
from language requiring a state law to regulate “insurance companies” or from section 2 of the
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2. Substantially Affect the Risk Pooling Arrangement between the
Insurer and the Insured
The Court also rejected the petitioners’ second claim that the AWP
laws did not regulate insurers with respect to an insurance practice
because the laws did not control the actual terms of insurance policies.142
First, the Court distinguished between § 2(b) McCarran-Ferguson Act—
an interpretation of which (Royal Drug) the petitioners relied upon in
their argument—and ERISA’s savings clause, saying that the savings
McCarran-Ferguson Act). Petitioners contended that the general AWP law, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
304.17A-270, was not “specifically directed toward” insurers because it applied to “self-insurer or
multiple employer welfare arrangement[s] not exempt from state regulation by ERISA.” Id. KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-005(3) (preempting the law as a result of it not being saved). The
Court disagreed because self-insured plans engaged in the same sort of risk pooling arrangements as
separate entities that provide insurance to an employee benefit plan. Miller, 538 U.S. at 336 n.1. A
contrary view would render the “deemer clause” superfluous, since that clause only comes into play
once the savings clause “saves” a state law from preemption because the law regulates insurance. Id.
The “savings” is revoked by the deemer clause if the law would allow the State to regulate a selfinsured employee benefit plan by deeming the plan to be an insurance company, other insurer, or
one engaged in the business of insurance. Id. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). Implicit in the deemer
clause’s construction was the determination that a law regarding all self-insured employee benefit
plans, including ERISA-protected plans, was initially “saved” because it did regulate insurance,
otherwise the law would not have been saved in the first place. Miller, 538 U.S. at 336 n.1. In the
end, only those self-insured employee benefit plans that are protected by ERISA are exempt from
state regulation. Id. Thus, the petitioners’ contention that the law was not “specifically directed
toward” insurers simply because it applied to “self-insurer or multiple employee benefit welfare
arrangements not exempt from state regulation by ERISA” failed because such laws would never be
saved from preemption in the first place. Id. In this case, all HMOs, including those that do not act
as insurers but provide only administrative services to self-insured plans, are regulated by both of
the AWP laws. Id. The Court did not agree that applying the laws to non-insuring HMOs forfeits the
laws’ status as “laws[s] . . . which regulat[e] insurance.” Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). First, it felt that for
the purposes of § 1144(b)(2)(A), the “activity of insurance” encompassed the administration of selfinsured plans by a non-insuring HMO. Miller, 538 U.S. at 336 n.1. Second, Rush Prudential
foreclosed this argument because in that case, the independent-review law in question contained
“some overbreadth in the application of [the law] beyond orthodox HMOs,” yet the Court held that
“there is no reason to think Congress would have meant such minimal application to noninsurers to
remove a state law entirely from the category of insurance regulation saved from preemption [sic].”
Id. (citing Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 372 (2002)). See Rafael Gely,
Supreme Court’s 2002 Term Employment Law Cases: Is This the Scalia Court?, 7 EMPL. RTS. &
EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 253, 260 (2003) (noting that Justice Scalia not only relied on the statutory text as
a basis for his interpretation, but he also placed the savings clause in the context of other ERISA
provisions).
142. Miller, 538 U.S. at 337 (alleging that the AWP laws focused upon the relationship
between an insurer and third-party providers, which did not constitute an “insurance practice”). The
petitioners relied on Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 210 (1979), in
which the Court held that third-party provider arrangements between insurers and pharmacies were
not “the ‘business of insurance’” under § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Miller, 538 U.S. at
337.
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clause is “not concerned with how to characterize conduct undertaken by
private actors, but with how to characterize state laws in regard to what
they ‘regulate’”.143 Then, by the way of an example involving lawyers
and mandatory continuing legal education hours,144 the Court found that
Kentucky’s AWP laws, which prohibit any “health insurer” from
discriminating against any willing provider, “‘regulat[e]’ insurance by
imposing conditions on the right to engage in the business of
insurance.”145 However, ERISA’s savings clause covers only those
“conditions on the right to engage in the business of insurance [that] also
substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and
the insured.”146 AWP laws “expan[d] the number of providers from

143. Miller, 538 U.S. at 337 (emphasis in original) (noting that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
provision is concerned with how to characterize conduct undertaken by private actors). The Court
noted that Royal Drug did not lead to the conclusion that a law mandating certain insurer-provider
relationships fails to “regulate insurance.” Id. See generally ASHLEY, supra note 45, § 9:17
(arguing that Pilot Life was full of flaws, the first of which involved the connection with the
McCarran-Ferguson factors, which was finally severed in Miller). The cases deciding what is the
“business of insurance” for McCarran-Ferguson purposes arise in significantly different contexts
from cases deciding what laws “regulate insurance” for ERISA purposes. Miller, 538 U.S. at 337.
“Business of insurance” cases normally arise when an administrative agency or private party
attempts to assert a federal statute, usually an antitrust statute, against an insurance company and the
insurance company defends the action by arguing that the McCarran-Ferguson Act preempts the
application of federal law to the insurance company’s activities because those activities are part of
the “business of insurance” within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. For ERISA
purposes, the question is not whether an enterprise has engaged in the business of insurance, but
whether the state statute asserted against an insurer is a law that regulates insurance. Id. E.g., Troger
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 633 F. Supp. 503 (D. Md. 1986), overruled, Pilot Life, 481 U.S. 41
(refusing to apply the McCarran-Ferguson factors because they do not determine what laws regulate
the business of insurance).
144. Miller, 538 U.S. at 337. The Court felt that the AWP laws operated in a similar manner
with respect to the insurance industry. Id.
A state law required all licensed attorneys to complete 10 hours of continuing legal
education (CLE) each year. This statute “regulates” the practice of law—even though
sitting through 10 hours of CLE classes does not constitute the practice of law—because
the state has conditioned the right to practice law on certain requirements, which
substantially affect the product delivered by lawyers to their clients.
Id. (emphasis in original).
145. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 337 (2003) (deciding that whether
or not an HMO’s contracts with providers constitute “the business of insurance” under Royal Drug
is beside the point).
146. Id. at 338 (noting that without the substantial affect on the risk pooling arrangement, any
state law aimed at insurance companies could be deemed a law that “regulates insurance,” which is
contrary to the Court’s interpretation of the savings clause in Rush Prudential). The petitioners
contended that the AWP laws failed this test because they did not alter or affect the terms of
insurance policies, but concern only the relationship between insureds and third-party providers. Id.
Rejecting this argument, the Court said that it has never held that state laws must alter or control the
actual terms of insurance policies to be deemed “laws . . . which regulat[e] insurance” under the
savings clause. Id.
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whom an insured may receive health services.”147 Thus, the laws “alter
the scope of permissible bargains between insurers and insureds in a
manner similar” to the laws that the Court upheld in three prior cases.148
Having found that the Kentucky AWP laws satisfied both of these
requirements, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth
Circuit.149
IV. ANALYSIS
Since the Supreme Court decided that common law bad faith claims
were preempted by ERISA in 1987,150 the tenor of its ERISA decisions
has prompted substantial discussion regarding how far the Court will
allow the states to “regulate” employee benefit plans.151 From mandated
mental health benefits152 to independent utilization review,153 and now
147. Id.
148. Miller, 538 U.S. at 338-39 (referring to the mandated-benefit laws upheld in Metropolitan
Life, the notice-prejudice rule sustained in UNUM, and the independent-review provisions approved
in Rush Prudential). Kentucky insureds no longer must trade off lower premiums for access only to
a closed network or health-care providers, and this prohibition, the Court said, substantially affects
the type of risk pooling arrangements that insurers may offer. Id. at 339.
149. Id. at 341-42.
150. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52 (finding that a bad faith cause of action rooted in Mississippi’s
common law was preempted by ERISA). For a contemporaneous analysis of Pilot Life, see Aldisert,
supra note 15, at 1367-83; Nelson, supra note 80, at 507.
151. See Pittman, supra note 97, at 416 (through their construction of ERISA’s preemption
clause, recent Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions have given more protection to state
law regulation of MCOs and their cost-cutting strategies); James Saya, Note, Removing a Roadblock
to Reforming Health Care: Ny. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
3 CONN. INS. L.J. 127 (1996) (viewing Travelers as allowing the states greater freedom to design
and implement health care legislation, restoring the states to their traditional role as formulators of
health care policy); Deborah S. Davidson, Note, Balancing the Interests of State Health Care
Reform and Uniform Employee Benefit Laws Under ERISA: A “Uniform Patient Protection Act,”
53 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 203 (2003) (discussing the Court’s shift to a more restrained
application of the preemption clause); Phyllis C. Borzi, Distinguishing Between Coverage and
Treatment Decisions Under ERISA Health Plans: What’s Left of ERISA Preemption?, 49 BUFFALO
L. REV. 1219, 1267-71 (2001) (noting that after twenty years of broadly interpreting the sweep of
ERISA preemption, the Court has narrowed ERISA’s reach). But see Patricia Mullen Ochmann,
Managed Care Organizations Manage to Escape Liability: Why Issues of Quantity vs. Quality Lead
to ERISA’s Inequitable Preemption of Claims, 34 AKRON L. REV. 571 (2001) (only Congress can
clarify the rights of patients against MCOs and rectify the inequities that plague plaintiffs in MCO
litigation).
152. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 758 (1985) (finding that a
Massachusetts statute setting forth mandatory minimum health care benefits for inclusion in general
insurance policies was not preempted by ERISA).
153. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (finding that Illinois law
requiring HMOs to provide independent review of disputes between primary care physician and
HMO, and to cover services deemed medically necessary by that independent reviewer, regulated
insurance within meaning of saving clause).
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Any Willing Provider statutes,154 the Court has expanded the definition
of a state insurance regulation.155 In Miller, Justice Scalia, for a
unanimous court, refused to pigeonhole the definition of “insurance” and
instead chose to analyze the relationship between the parties.156
A. The Perceived Impact of Miller
Immediately following the Court’s decision, reaction to the ruling
was mixed. The perceived consensus was that Miller’s expansiveness
would permit the states greater room to regulate MCOs.157 State
regulators and providers viewed the ruling as a victory in their efforts to
enforce HMO accountability and consumer access to care.158 But the
154. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003) (finding that Kentucky’s
Any Willing Provider statute was saved from ERISA preemption).
155. Larry J. Pittman, ERISA’s Preemption Clause: Progress Towards a More Equitable
Preemption of State Laws, 34 IND. L. REV. 207, 229-232 (2001) (arguing that the Pegram case is an
extension of the Supreme Court’s efforts to narrow the scope of ERISA preemption). But see
Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix It: Reinterpreting
ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457 (arguing that the Supreme Court missed opportunities to
rationalize the body of law encompassing negligence claims against and benefit regulation of
managed care organizations, further entrenching a failed jurisprudence of managed care).
156. Miller, 538 U.S. at 337-38 (holding that the savings clause looks at the state law, not the
conduct of private individuals, i.e., in relation to the “business of insurance” test used under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act).
157. Marie Suszynski, Attorney: Supreme Court Ruling Boosts States’ Power over HMOs,
BESTWIRE, Apr. 21, 2003. Mark Gallant, chairman of the health law department at Cozen
O’Connor, said that “[u]nder older case law, it was a harder test to demonstrate whether a law
regulated insurance. Here, the Supreme Court blew the lid off the older test and took a broad view.”
Id. But Anthony F. Shelley, an attorney at Miller & Chevalier in Washington, D.C., considered the
clearer test “more favorable to ERISA.” Lee, supra note 5. He commented that “[b]efore, the courts
used the ‘I know it when I see it’ criteria, but now the test narrows the inquiry somewhat.” Id.
Miller still adversely affects fully-insured plans, he said, because it subjects them to “many more
state regulations,” and in the end, that could drive up premiums. Id. Penelope Lemov, in
GOVERNING MAGAZINE, noted Miller’s importance, but stated that “in a practical sense, the
victories may be less than meets the eye” since budget crises may cause states to “capitalize on their
power to inhibit managed-care strategies—at least not right now.” Penelope Lemov, Blocking
ERISA, GOVERNING, May 1, 2003, at 74. See also Jurand, supra note 98 (“[t]he Court’s willingness
to take a fresh look at the savings-clause prong of the preemption test indicates that they may be
willing to take a fresh look at the other portions of the statute and possibly interpret them favorably
for plaintiffs.”).
158. Benko, supra note 101. The American Medical Association, which has submitted amici
briefs to the Supreme Court in recent years, also applauded the decision. AMA Commends Supreme
Court Decision that Reduces Confusion Surrounding Laws Regulating Health Insurers, AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASS’N, Apr. 3, 2003, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/print/article/92557495.html. Elizabeth Johnson, counsel for the Kentucky Department of Insurance, agreed that the
“broader” interpretation of ERISA exemptions allows states to address health care issues that
Congress has yet to resolve. Benko, supra (“[w]hile the [C]ourt has consistently leaned toward
giving states more power [to address health care issues that Congress has not resolved], this
landmark ruling really drives that idea home”). This decision is also seen as a continuation of the
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health care industry feared that greater state regulation will translate into
higher costs, which they say they will be forced to pass on to their plan
participants.159 Such a combination—increasing state authority to
interfere with HMOs as they bargain with providers and expanding the
savings clause umbrella—may prove to be a lethal combination for the
managed care industry.160 Others worried about the greater impact on the
larger companies that self-insure.161 Ultimately, only time will tell what
Miller’s real impact on insurers will be.162
Court’s defederalization “policy” that has given more power to the states. Lorraine Schmall and
Brenda Stephens, ERISA Preemption: A Move Towards Defederalizing Claims for Patients’ Rights,
42 BRANDEIS L.J. 529, 572 (2004) (“Court further defederalized state claims which lower courts
might tend to find preempted”); but see Carol S. Weissart, Promise and Perils of State-Based Road
to Universal Insurance in the U.S., 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 42, 51 (2004) (“[w]hile these
cases seem to be narrowing ERISA’s preemption, ERISA continues to impede comprehensive state
action”).
159. Leo T. Crowley, Supreme Court Narrowly Construes ERISA Preemption, N.Y.L.J., Apr.
29, 2003, at 3, col. 1. Benko, supra note 101 (statement by Melodie Shrader, Ky. Ass’n of Health
Plans) (“[g]overnment interferences masquerading as patient protections are actually having the
opposite effect as healthcare costs increase and more Americans go uninsured”).
160. Crowley, supra note 159 (“[Miller] appears likely to open the doors to higher health care
costs through allowing states to pass regulations that prevent HMOs from bargaining with providers
for lower costs at the same time that it broadens the ERISA savings clause in the insurance area by a
considerable margin”). See also Benko, supra note 101 (“[t]his could prove to be a final nail in the
coffin of managed care”) (statement by Chip Kahn, Federation of American Hospitals). But one
industry insider saw Miller as the end of ERISA. Mark A. Hofmann, Supreme Court Rules Any
Willing Provider Law Not Pre-Empted by ERISA; Health Plans Fear Cost Increase, BUSINESS
INSURANCE, Apr. 7, 2003, at 4 (statement by Neil Trautwein, Nat’l Ass’n of Manufacturers) (“[t]his
is a horrible decision—yet another nail in the coffin of ERISA”). An insurance analyst with
Standard & Poor’s disagreed with the dire predictions by the industry. Benko, supra note 101. He
stated that most health plans have found other ways to retain their bargaining power and that the
ruling will “probably cause a small deterioration in (profit) margins, but certainly nothing that
would severely disrupt operations or throw insurers into insolvency.” Id. (parenthetical text in
original). But see Weissart, supra note 158, at 51 (narrowing of ERISA preemption has not opened
the door for comprehensive state action).
161. John Carroll, AWP Reimbursement Ruling May Be More Than Meets Eye, MANAGED
CARE,
May
2003,
available
at
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0305/
0305.regulation.html (quoting industry analysts worried that the states will read Miller as their green
light to regulate insurance, self-insured or not); Alden J. Bianchi, Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans v.
Miller—The Expanding Scope of the ERISA Saving Clause and the Future of State Regulation of
Managed Care Organizations, 44 BNA TAX MANAGEMENT MEMORANDUM 15, July 28, 2003,
available at http://www.bnatax.com/tm/jc_memorandum_vol44no15.htm (noting the potential
Pandora’s Box in one of the Court’s lengthy footnotes for self-funded plans with insurers or HMOs
providing administrative-services-only). Bianchi concludes that “[w]hile there is nothing on the face
of Miller that should change the ERISA treatment of alternative remedies, its tone and tenor make it
easier for states to move in this direction.” Id. Presently, the “deemer” clause, 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(2)(B) (2000) prevents the states from considering self-insured benefit plans for state
regulation of insurance. See text § II(A)(2)(d) and notes 71-74.
162. Benko, supra note 101 (statement by Karen Ignagni, American Ass’n of Health Plans)
(Miller “changes little in the current healthcare delivery system”). Kentucky’s AWP law had been

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 8
VANSUCH.DOC

284

12/17/2004 12:13 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[38:253

Looking at the legal aspects of the decision, reaction focused
mainly on Justice Scalia’s new test. Some commentators were shocked,
while others appreciated the Court’s attempt to clarify a very murky area
of law.163 A handful criticized the Court’s holding from a legal
perspective,164 as they feared that the relatively stagnant ERISA waters
would be stirred as new court challenges would seek to expand this
holding to areas previously held to be preempted.165
Similar to a good bottle of wine, the kinks in any new test work
themselves out—and hence get better—with time. A recent example of
the Supreme Court announcing a new test in a non-criminal setting
involved the admissibility of expert scientific evidence under Federal
Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702.166 The District of Columbia Circuit Court
in effect for nine years prior to the ruling, and insurers outside of Kentucky responded to the
demands of consumers and regulators in that time. Id. As a result, insurers offered more product
choices and built a higher-quality healthcare system, with the majority of health plans already
opening their networks to include 90% of providers. Id.
The greatest effect most likely will be on health plans that operate in states that do not have
AWP laws, since HMOs in states with AWP laws have already factored the cost impact into their
operations. Benko, supra note 101 (statement by Dick Brown, Humana). But the National
Community Pharmacists Association believed that Miller is more important in those states that do
have AWP laws on the books, as this decision will “stiffen the spines of state insurance
commissioners when it comes to enforcing” AWP laws. Carol Ukens, Supreme Court Hands
Pharmacy a Victory, DRUG TOPICS, no. 9, vol. 147, May 5, 2003, at 25 (“[w]e’ll get better
enforcement because there won’t be ERISA hanging over proper enforcement”). For those states
without AWP laws, the disappearance of the ERISA “specter” will take away from HMOs the
“singular argument they have used in the states” to prevent legislatures from enacting such laws. Id.
(pharmacy benefit managers “and insurance companies scare the bejesus out of folks with ERISA.
They come in at the last minute and say, ‘There’s no use passing this bill; it’ll be preempted by
ERISA’”).
163. Lee, supra note 5 (statement by Anthony F. Shelley). The unanimity of the decision
increased fodder for discussion. Mark Gallant, chairman of the health law department at Cozen
O’Connor, believed that this demonstrated a “strong desire on the Court’s part to let states regulate
health-care delivery.” Suszynski, supra note 157. E.g., Hofmann, supra note 160 (“[t]he court
seems to be sending a very strong signal that the days of expansive ERISA pre-emption are long
over”). But see Robert W. McCann, MANAGED HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVE, no. 6, vol. 13, at 14,
June 1, 2003 (“The ruling marked a turnabout in judicial opinion concerning the states’ ability to
regulate health plan operations”).
164. Joseph Beachwood, editor-in-chief of the CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAW LETTER,
referred to the unanimous decision as a “pretty remarkable joke.” Lee, supra note 5. While referring
to the other ERISA case decided in the 2002-03 term [The Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord,
538 U.S. 822 (2003)], Mr. Beachwood said, “[t]he Court decided not to create a rule where there is
no statutory or regulatory basis for it.” Id.
165. McCann, supra note 163. With a test less stringent than McCarran-Ferguson, a law may
regulate insurance without necessarily regulating the “business of insurance,” calling into question a
variety of state laws that previously had been assumed to be pre-empted. Id. McCann proposes that
“any state law that might be categorized as regulating operations or dealing with unfair insurance
practices is probably up for reconsideration.” Id.
166. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585-590 (1993) (rejecting the Frye
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of Appeals first used the “general acceptance” test in Frye v. United
States.167 When the FRE came into effect in 1975, the federal courts
were divided over Frye’s continued validity since the FRE contained a
rule concerning the admissibility of scientific expert evidence.168 In
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court
rejected the “general acceptance” test as a precondition for the
admissibility of scientific evidence under FRE 702.169 Daubert’s impact
was uncertain because the Court had disregarded a familiar test170 valued
for its simplicity in favor of an indeterminate rule and four factors that
the court should consider.171 One school of thought perceived Daubert as
“open[ing] the courts to scientific evidence that was [previously]
excluded under Frye,” while another saw it as “bar[ring] evidence that
[had] been generally accepted but [now could not] meet the new

“general acceptance” test for the admissibility of expert testimony). The Supreme Court requires a
proponent who proffers a witness as a scientific expert to establish that the witness’ underlying
theory or technique qualifies as reliable “scientific . . . knowledge.” Id. FRE 702 says:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. § 702. While not technically a new “test” per se (the FRE had been in force for
eighteen years prior to Daubert), the Supreme Court reversed seventy years of jurisprudence by
removing the “general acceptance” threshold from the federal courts and reinforcing Rule 702 as the
only standard for the admissibility of expert scientific evidence. Id. This was an abrupt and
significant shift in the Court’s jurisprudence on the matter; this is the situation with the new test for
when a state law regulates insurance for ERISA purposes. Id.
167. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (“sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”), superseded by FRE 702
as stated in Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
168. PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE § 24.04[C] (2003).
169. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. The Court ultimately found that the “Rules’ permissive
backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention ‘general
acceptance,’” made the “assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye” unconvincing. Id. at
589.
170. Most jurisdictions and circuits had followed the Frye test for more than half-a-century.
ROGER C. PARK, DAVID P. LEONARD, & STEVEN H. GOLDBERG, EVIDENCE LAW § 10.04 (1998)
(noting that the Frye test dominated admission of and discussion about expert scientific testimony).
Not all jurisdictions adopted it, nor did all the judges and commentators support it. Id.
171. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. The courts appreciated the deference that the Frye test
gave to those educated in the scientific field at issue. PARK, supra note 170, § 10.04; David O.
Stewart, A New Test: Decision Creates Uncertain Future for Admissibility of Expert Testimony, 79
A.B.A. J. 48 (Nov. 1993) (Prof. Edward J. Imwinkelried, University of California at Davis School
of Law) (“[o]ne of the reasons Frye survived so long . . . is that judges and lawyers were
comfortable with it, since it liberated you from having to determine the reliability of scientific
evidence”).
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Similar ambivalence has appeared after

B. Subtle Differences between “Risk Shifting” and “Risk Pooling”
There are two conceptual schemes related to the definition of
insurance: “risk shifting” and “risk pooling.”174 The process of risk
transferring or shifting is narrow, covering only those arrangements that
affect the risk between the insured and insurer.175 By transferring risk
from the insured to the insurer, the insured’s uncertainty is reduced by
the knowledge that its economic loss will be restored either in whole or
in part.176 “Risk pooling” deemphasizes the “risk transfer” aspect by
focusing on the spreading of the insured’s risk with that of similarly
exposed individuals.177 As such, “risk-pooling” is broader concept than
“risk spreading.”178
In Miller, the Court specifically chose “risk pooling arrangement”
to characterize those relationships under the “insurance” umbrella in
which the state would be allowed to regulate.179 The state law is not
172. Stewart, supra note 171. For a general discussion of the cases following Daubert and
leading up to Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), see Leslie Morsek, Get on
Board for the Ride of Your Life! The Ups, Downs, the Twists, and the Turns of the Applicability of
the “Gatekeeper” Function to Scientific and Non-Scientific Expert Evidence: Kumho’s Expansion
of Daubert, 34 AKRON L. REV. 689 (2001).
173. Mazer, supra note 18, at 14 (noting that Miller provides little principled guidance to the
lower courts); but see Daniel Alter, Another View of Miller, 78 FLA. BAR J. 4 (March 2004) (stating
that Miller does not change the status quo).
174. Bianchi, supra note 161; APPLEMAN, supra note 15, § 1.3 (discussing risk-sharing as a
transfer of risk to others and a distribution of the risk among the others).
175. See Miller, 538 U.S. at 342; Bianchi, supra note 161.
176. Bianchi, supra note 161.
177. Id. As a result of the pooling of these many risks, an insured’s uncertain risk of loss is
reduced. Id. See also Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 128 n7, 102 S.Ct. 3002
(1982) (“a number of risks are accepted, some of which involve losses”; “losses are spread over all
the risks so as to enable the insurer to accept each risk at a slight fraction of the possible liability
upon it”) (internal quotations omitted); Hollaway v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 89 P.3d 1022,
1029 (Okla. 2003) (risk pooling groups “those with greater and lesser risks together to better
account and minimize the unpredictable risk for everyone” and “results in spreading the cost of risks
of loss for which an insurer must pay across the span of insureds”).
178. See, e.g., Elliot v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting
that “risk pooling” is broader than “risk spreading”).
179. Miller, 538 U.S. at 338. The petitioners had argued that the AWP laws did not
“substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement undertaken by insurer and insured . . . since they
[did] not alter or affect the terms of insurance policies, but concern[ed] only the relationship
between insureds and third-party providers.” Id. The Court disagreed, specifically saying that it had
“never held that state laws must alter or control the actual terms of insurance policies to be deemed
‘laws . . . which regulat[e] insurance’ under § 1144(b)(2)(A); it suffices that they substantially affect
the risk pooling arrangement between insurer and insured.” Id.
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required to actually spread or transfer risk to be saved from
preemption.180 Instead, the state law need only affect the relationship or
the bargain between the insurer and the insured.181 Given the Court’s
willingness to find that a state law governing the relationship between
the insurer and a third-party affects the risk-pooling arrangement, this
standard may not be too difficult to satisfy.182
C. Another Look at the Supreme Court’s Savings Clause Philosophy
under Pilot Life and Metropolitan Life
To recognize the jurisprudential change in the savings clause
analysis after Miller, it is important to see how the Supreme Court
initially analyzed state laws under the savings clause.
1. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux
Mr. Dedeaux’s complaint alleged three causes of action, all of
which were rooted in common law.183 The Court noted that the
Mississippi Supreme Court recognized punitive damages in contract
cases where “‘the act or omission constituting the breach of the contract
amounts also to the commission of a tort.’”184 The state supreme court

180. Miller, 538 U.S. at 338.
181. Id.
182. Crowley, supra note 159 (“The Kentucky court has adopted a test so broad as to
potentially remove much of the analytical work in determining if a state law falls under the clause”).
But see Mazer, supra note 18, at 14 (commenting that Miller’s second part is equally elastic and
opaque, providing little principled guidance). It is not certain whether these laws must affect
premium calculations, impose additional obligations on insurers, or prohibit certain insurance
practices in order to “affect” risk pooling. Id. While this requirement is clearer than the McCarranFerguson factors, it is not clear enough to erase the Court’s obligation to clarify this prong on a
case-by-case basis. Larry J. Pittman, A Plain Meaning Interpretation of ERISA’s Preemption and
Savings Clauses: In Support of a State Law Preemption of Section 1132(A) of ERISA’s Civil
Enforcement Provisions, 41 S. DIEGO L. REV. 593, 601 (2004).
183. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987). Mr. Dedeaux alleged tortious
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and fraud in the inducement. Id. at 43. He did not
assert any of the causes of action provided by ERISA. Id. at 44. He sought damages for benefits
due, mental and emotional distress, and punitive damages. Id. at 43-44.
184. Id. at 49 (citing Hood v. Moffett, 109 Miss. 757, 767 (Miss. 1915)). This claim is similar
to a first-party bad faith claim. The Court noted that the Mississippi Supreme Court relied on its
prior common law breach of contract rulings when it upheld awards of punitive damages against
insurance companies for failure to pay a claim under an insurance contract. Id. (citing Standard Life
Ins. Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239 (Miss. 1977)). The Court also noted that the Mississippi Supreme
Court had “used the identical formulation” for such claims against insurance companies that it “first
stated in [American Railway Express Co. v.] Bailey, [142 Miss. 622, 631 (Miss. 1915),] of what
must ‘attend’ the breach of contract in order for punitive damages to be recoverable.” Pilot Life,
481 U.S. at 49-50.
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eventually phrased the bad faith claim in relation to the insurance carrier,
but it did not limit the availability of punitive damages for breach of
contract to only insurance contracts. 185
The Supreme Court began its analysis using the “common-sense”
186
test, first commenting that a law must be “specifically directed toward
the insurance industry,” and “not just have an impact on” it.187 Even
though the law of bad faith in Mississippi was identified with the
insurance industry, the Court saw the roots of the law “firmly planted in
the general principles of Mississippi tort and contract law.” 188 This led
the Court to conclude that the savings clause did not save causes of
action based on these principles.189
The McCarran-Ferguson factors were not a separate step or element
in the Court’s pre-Miller analysis,190 but the Court used them for
“reassurance” that Mississippi’s bad faith law did not regulate
insurance.191 There were not that many cases with which the Court
could compare the Mississippi claim, so it compared the common law
bad faith law to the mandated-benefits law it saved from preemption in
Metropolitan Life.192 As the Court’s first interpretation of the savings
clause, Metropolitan Life’s formulation of a “test” and the Court’s
application of that test to a state statute established the benchmark from
which all future analyses arose.
185. Id. at 50 (citing Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Miss., Inc. v. Campbell, 466 So. 2d 833, 842
(Miss. 1984)) (“[w]e have come to term an insurance carrier which refuses to pay a claim when
there is no reasonably arguable basis to deny it as acting in ‘bad faith,’ and a lawsuit based upon
such an arbitrary refusal as a ‘bad faith’ cause of action”). This bolstered the Court’s view that the
common law roots of the bad faith law could not be ignored. Id.
186. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (common-sense view of the
language of the saving clause itself provides guidance as to whether a state law falls under the
saving clause).
187. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 51. The first step in the new test propounded by the Miller Court
also includes the “specifically directed” language. Miller, 538 U.S. at 334. In Miller, the Court cited
Pilot Life for this proposition. Id.
188. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 51. The Court also noted that “[a]ny breach of contract, and not
merely breach of an insurance contract, may lead to liability for punitive damages under Mississippi
law.” Id.
189. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987).
190. In various cases, the McCarran-Ferguson factors have been used as “considerations [to be]
weighed” in determining whether a state law falls under the savings clause, Miller, 538 U.S. at 341
(citing Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 49), “checking points” used after determining whether the state law
regulates insurance from a “common-sense” understanding, id. (citing UNUM Life Ins. Co. of
America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 374 (1999), and “guideposts” to “confirm [the Court’s] conclusion,
id. (citing Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 373 (2002)).
191. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50 (“[n]either do the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors support the
assertion that the Mississippi law of bad faith ‘regulates insurance’”).
192. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50-51 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724
(1985)).
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2. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts
A Massachusetts statute required insurance carriers to provide
specified minimum mental-health-care benefits to its residents.193
Throughout its opinion, the Court consistently referred to the statute and
the “substantive terms” of insurance contracts,194 initially noting that
states subject group health insurance to extensive regulation.195 The
Court felt that “[m]andated-benefit laws,” which “require an insurer to
provide a certain kind of benefit to cover a specified illness or procedure
whenever someone purchases a certain kind of insurance, are a subclass
of such content regulation.”196 Massachusetts’ law also met all three of
the McCarran-Ferguson factors: it regulated the spreading of risk,197 it
regulated an integral part of the relationship between the insurer and the
policyholder,198 and it was limited to entities within the insurance

193. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 727.
194. Id. at 726-28.
195. Id. at 727-28. Categorizing the types of state regulation of group insurance as “regulation
of the carrier, regulation of the sale and advertising of the insurance, and regulation of the content of
the contracts,” id., the Court noted the three varieties of common insurer regulations: solvency or
the qualification of management, aspects of transacting the business of group insurance (including
claim practices or rates), and content of group policies. Id. at 728 n.2.
196. Id. at 728. The Court rejected Metropolitan Life’s contention that laws that regulate the
substantive terms of insurance contracts are health laws, not insurance laws, disagreeing on two
counts. Id. at 741-42. First, this distinction reads the saving clause out of ERISA entirely, “because
laws that regulate only the insurer, or the way in which it may sell insurance, do not ‘relate to’
benefit plans.” Id. at 741. Since they would not be preempted by ERISA § 514(a), there would be
no reason for the saving clause to “save” them. Id. Second, Congress gave no indication that the
saving clause was to be read broadly so as “to guard against too expansive readings of the general
pre-emption clause that might have included laws wholly unrelated to plans,” e.g., laws that do not
“relate to” benefit plans. Id. at 741-42. The Court cited seven cases to support the statement that
“nearly every court that has addressed the question has concluded that laws regulating the
substantive content of insurance contracts are laws that regulate insurance and thus are within the
scope of the insurance saving clause.” Id. at 742 n.18.
197. Id. at 743 (mandated-benefit law was “intended to effectuate the legislative judgment that
the risk of mental-health care should be shared”). Massachusetts wanted to protect it and its working
citizens from the high cost of treatment for mental illness, recognizing that “the voluntary insurance
market was not adequately providing mental-health coverage, because of ‘adverse selection’ in
mental-health insurance.” Id. at 731. Adverse selection occurs when the people who sign up for an
insurance plan have costs that are greater than the expected costs that the insurance plan used to
calculate the premium.
Adverse Selection and Cream Skimming (2002), available at
http://www.healthinsurance.info/HISEL.HTM. Massachusetts also wanted to correct the insurance
market “by mandating minimum-coverage levels, effectively forcing the good-risk individuals to
become part of the risk pool, and enabling insurers to price the insurance at an average market
rather than a market retracted due to adverse selection.” Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 743.
198. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985) (“[i]t is also evident that
mandated-benefit laws directly regulate an integral part of the relationship between the insurer and
the policyholder by limiting the type of insurance that an insurer may sell to the policyholder”).
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industry.199 Thus, the mandated-benefit laws were saved from ERISA
preemption.200
3. The Substantial Burden of Metropolitan Life
The lingering effects of Metropolitan Life and its almost-redundant
emphasis on “substantive terms” appear in the Court’s analysis in Pilot
Life.201 The Court clearly analogizes Mississippi’s common law bad
faith claim to Massachusetts’ mandated-benefits law.202 The bad faith
law stood no chance of survival when compared to a strong and
“obvious” state law that regulated insurance by regulating the
substantive terms of an insurance contract.203
Massachusetts set out to force insurance carriers to carry
individuals that they would not otherwise carry, and in the end,
everyone’s premiums were affected.204 Mississippi’s common law
certainly did not “effect a spreading of policyholder risk” by forcing
adverse selection on insurers.205 Contrasting the bad faith law to the
mandated-benefits law, the Court specifically said that the “common law
of bad faith does not define the terms of the relationship between the
insurer and the insured.”206 Instead, the Court characterized the law as
one that provides punitive damages in certain circumstances for breach
of an insurance contract, regardless of whatever terms the parties may
have agreed upon in that contract.207
The rest of the opinion merely emphasizes that the Court was
looking at the bad faith law as one concerned mainly with remedies and
not the actual relationship between the parties.208 Instead of relying
upon the “factors by which [they] were guided in Metropolitan Life” as
the sole interpretation of the savings clause, the Court felt obliged to
199. Id. at 743 (the mandated-benefit statutes impose requirements only on insurers). Here, the
Court added that the mandated-benefit laws had “the intent of affecting the relationship between the
insurer and the policyholder.” Id.
200. Id. at 758.
201. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 51.
202. Id. (“Unlike the mandated-benefits law at issue in Metropolitan Life,” and “[i]n contrast to
the mandated-benefits law in Metropolitan Life”).
203. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 740 (“[t]o state the obvious, [the mandated-benefit law]
regulates the terms of certain insurance contracts”).
204. See id. at 731.
205. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50. The Court also found the connection to the insurer-insured
relationship “attenuated at best.” Id. at 51.
206. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 52-56 (discussing the exclusive remedies in § 502 that ERISA provides to plan
participants).
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place the savings clause in the context of ERISA as a whole.209 Once
again, the state cause of action is cast as one seeking “remedies for the
improper processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated
plan.”210 From this discussion of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions
flows the concept of complete preemption.211
D. What Remains after Miller’s Rebottling of the “Savings” Analysis?
What emerges from Metropolitan Life and Pilot Life is the
conclusion that the regulation of the substantive terms of an insurance
contract—a true spreading of the risk—was part-and-parcel to the
preemption analysis using the McCarran-Ferguson factors.212 As
discussed above, the Court decided both of these cases with this
emphasis in mind.213 Those courts that relied on Pilot Life for the
precedent that ERISA preempts any bad faith claim against an employee
benefit plan failed to recognize that the Court has moved away from
reliance on the McCarran-Ferguson factors’ emphasis on the substantive
terms of the contract.214 In fact, the Court expressly rebuked the position
209. Id. at 51 (“We are obliged in interpreting the saving clause to consider not only the factors
by which we were guided in Metropolitan Life, but also the role of the saving clause in ERISA as a
whole”).
210. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987) (“Our understanding of the saving
clause must be informed by the legislative intent concerning the civil enforcement provisions
provided by ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)”).
211. See text supra § II(A)(2)(a). 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000). When analyzing state bas faith
claims against ERISA providers, some district courts, before Davila, viewed the preemption and
savings clause analysis as superfluous, since they followed Pilot Life’s analysis that state bad faith
statutes will be completely preempted for providing an extra remedy.
212. See Miller, 538 U.S. at 338-39.
213. See text supra § IV(C) and notes 183-211.
214. While the proposition that the Court is moving away from this dependence on the
substantive terms of the contract finds support in Justice Scalia’s opinion, the oral argument would
appear to give a contrary impression. Transcript, U.S.S. Ct. (No. 00-1471), Ky. Ass’n of Health
Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003), available at 2003 WL 145394. Oral arguments began
with Justices Souter and Scalia focusing on the AWP law’s practical effect on the policy:
MR. ECCLES: [They] change the network, that’s correct, Your Honor. [They]
potentially change the network. The law itself creates no change. If the provider elects to
join the network, and is willing to accept the terms—
QUESTION: But isn’t that a change in the policy? Doesn’t it give the patient a right he
otherwise would not have?
...
QUESTION: Well, there’s nothing in the policy term that is changed [in] the literal sense
of a change in language, but it seems to me that it does mean that under a policy subject
to a law like Kentucky’s the person who joins the HMO, in effect the person who obtains
the insurance, has a far greater choice, [in] the expenditure of benefits under the policy
than he otherwise has. He’s getting something under a policy subject to the [Kentucky]
law, that he does not get under a policy without that law, and that is a breadth of choice
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that “state laws must alter or control the actual terms of insurance
policies to be deemed ‘laws . . . which regulat[e] insurance’ under §
1144(b)(2)(A).”215 Rather than look to the terms of the policy, the Court
turned to the agreement between the parties, emphasizing that the “AWP
laws alter[ed] the scope of permissible bargains between insurers and
insureds.”216
The Court removed from the new analysis any consideration of
whether the state law in question forms an integral part of the insurance
policy.217 The Court also recast the mandated-benefits law from
Metropolitan Life in this light.218 It rationalized the notice-prejudice rule
from Ward219 by saying that that rule “govern[ed] whether or not an
about who is going to treat him.
...
QUESTION: . . . [e]ven if nobody elected to join, what has happened by reason of this
law, is it not the case that the term of the policy is changed, that originally the policy
said, we will pay for your treatment by a limited number of individuals whom—whom
we—whom we approve, and that policy is now changed to, by reason of this law, we
will pay for your treatment by any individuals who want to join our plan. Isn’t—isn’t
that a different policy?
...
QUESTION: It’s not rewritten, but doesn’t the law . . . effectively change the term of the
policy?
Transcript, at *6-*8. Later in the argument, the justices’ perspective on the matter became very
apparent:
QUESTION: I hear you, I just don’t see that—that you—you make much headway in
saying that isn’t a change.
...
QUESTION: I don’t—you—you’re really asserting that—that two insurance policies are
exactly the same, their terms haven’t changed, or their terms aren’t different, where one
says you can get your automobile fixed by these companies, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah,
and the other one says, we will pay to get your automobile fixed by any company that is
willing to do the job up to our standards, and—and you think those two insurance
policies are saying exactly the same thing, that there’s only a hypothetical difference
between the two.
Id. at *12-*13.
215. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc., v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 338 (2003). Instead, the Court
held that “it suffices that they substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between insurer and
insured.” Id. See Kidneigh v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, 345 F.3d 1182, 1197 (10th Cir.
2003) (Henry, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“Miller, in contrast [to Mississippi’s
common law of bad faith], specifically disavowed the McCarran-Ferguson factors, including the test
of ‘whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk,’ the test
relied on in Pilot Life”).
216. Miller, 538 U.S. at 338-39.
217. Horst & Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 41.
218. Miller, 538 U.S. at 338-39. The court also found the effect of the AWP laws similar to the
notice-prejudice rule in UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999), and the
independent-review provisions in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002), both
of which were saved from preemption. Miller, 538 U.S. at 340.
219. Ward, 526 U.S. at 358 (saving California’s notice-prejudice rule from preemption).
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insurance company must cover claims submitted late, which dictate[ed]
to the insurance company the conditions under which it must pay for the
risk it has assumed.”220 This, the Court felt, “certainly qualifie[d] [it] as
a substantial effect on the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer
and insured.”221
Though it appears that Davila foreclosed any further discussion of
bad faith claims, the state laws upon which those claims were based
provide an illustration of how Miller’s analysis is substantively different
from the previous test.222 If the Miller Court was correct when it said
that it had “never held that the McCarran-Ferguson factors [were] an
essential component of the” savings clause inquiry,223 then the analysis
in Pilot Life, which analyzed the common law bad faith claim in
comparison to the mandated-benefit law, should have been limited to
common law bad faith claims.224 Pilot Life’s holding should also have
been reexamined given that Miller expressly disavowed the McCarranFerguson factors that the Court in Pilot Life relied upon to find the bad
faith claim preempted.225 For the courts, this should have meant that
220. Miller, 538 U.S. at 339 n.3 (emphasis added).
221. Id. One of the arguments in favor of saving bad faith laws was that they, too, dictated to
the insurance company the conditions under which the insurance company must pay for the risk that
the insurance company assumed. See Kidneigh, 345 F.3d at 1198 (Henry, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (Colorado bad faith statute “changes the conditions under which an insurer will
‘pay for the risk that it has assumed,’ by making the law decisively clear that the risk of
nonperformance in settlement negotiations lies with the insurer”); Elliot v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co.,
337 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “it is entirely plausible to find that the [Montana
unfair trade practices act] allocates risk ‘by obligating insurers to make advance payments before
the duty to indemnify under the policy is triggered’ and ‘by requiring insurers to pay excess
judgments against their insureds’ in the case of a[n unfair trade practices act] violation”). Davila
never addressed the savings clause aspect of preemption but held Texas’ patient rights statute
preempted based on the theory of complete preemption. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct.
2488, 2493, 159 L.Ed. 2d 312 (2004).
222. Even before Davila was decided, some commentators, while acknowledging that Miller
was different from common sense and McCarran-Ferguson, believed that Miller continued to
preempt bad faith laws. Horst & Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 38-42.
223. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc., v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341 (2003).
224. The Miller Court characterized Pilot Life’s inquiry as: “whether Mississippi’s law of bad
faith has the effect of transferring or spreading the risk, whether that law is integral to the insurerinsured relationship, and whether that law is limited to the insurance industry.” Miller, 538 U.S. at
340-41 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). It is interesting to note that the Pilot Life Court did
not use the word “transfer” in its decision, but used “spreading” instead. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50
(“the Mississippi common law of bad faith does not effect a spreading of policyholder risk”)
(emphasis added).
225. Mazer, supra note 18, at 10. See Miller, 538 U.S. at 341 (“We make a clean break from
the McCarran-Ferguson factors”). See also Eric P. Weitz, Does ERISA Still Pre-empt Bad Faith
Claims?, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 28, 2003, at 5, available at LEXIS, Legal News,
LGINT. In Metropolitan Life, the Court stated that “the saving clause and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act serve the same federal policy and utilize similar language to define what is left to the States.”
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they needed to evaluate all state laws, including bad faith statutes, under
the new test, instead of basing their decisions on Pilot Life’s weakened
holding or the disavowed McCarran-Ferguson factors.226 But one term
later, the Supreme Court failed to even cite Miller in its Davila
decision.227
E. Miller Breaks Away
An important difference between Pilot Life and Miller is the type of
impact that the Court required the state law to impart upon the risk. In
Pilot Life, the common law of bad faith did “not effect a spreading of
policyholder risk.”228 In contrast, Kentucky’s AWP law needed only to
“substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer
and the insured.”229 As shown below, the syntax in both decisions, while
Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 744 n.21. The Miller Court rejected this premise, saying, “ERISA’s
savings clause, however, is not concerned (as is the McCarran-Ferguson Act provision) with how to
characterize conduct undertaken by private actors, but with how to characterize state laws in regard
to what they ‘regulate.’” Miller, 538 U.S. at 337 (emphasis in original). Where the McCarranFerguson Act “concern[ed] itself with whether certain practices constitute[d] ‘[t]he business of
insurance,’ or whether a state law was ‘enacted . . . for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance,’ [the savings clause] asks merely whether a state law is a ‘law . . . which regulates
insurance, banking, or securities.’” Id. at 340. With regard to the “similar language” claim in
Metropolitan Life, the Miller Court stated that “the statutory language of [the savings clause] differs
substantially from that of the Mc-Carran-Ferguson Act.” Id. The Third Circuit, in a post-Davila
decision, found the Supreme Court’s analysis in Pilot Life instructive and still valid on the point that
the “common law of bad faith does not define the terms of the relationship between the insurer and
the insured; it declares only that, whatever the terms have been agreed upon in the insurance
contract, a breach of that contract may in certain circumstances allow the policyholder to obtain
punitive damages.” Barber v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 383 F.3d 134, 143 n.12 (3d. Cir. 2004)
(citing Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 49-51).
226. Mazer, supra note 18, at 14 (suggesting that the extension of Pilot Life to bad faith
statutes in state insurance codes fails to meaningfully address whether a particular state law is
specifically directed at the insurance industry, much less whether it regulates insurance); Horst &
Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 40 (commenting that Miller will require courts to approach the
preemption issue from a different perspective by focusing on the risk pooling arrangement). Horst
and Rosenberg note that before Miller, most courts sidestepped the issue of whether bad faith laws
substantially affected the risk pooling arrangement between an insurer and insured. Id. Instead,
these courts focused on whether the bad faith cause of action became an integral part of the
insurance policy. Id. After Miller, some courts analyzed whether the state bad faith law substantially
affected the risk pooling arrangement in essentially the same manner as they had analyzed the
“integral part of the policy relationship” factor. Id. at 41. See also Kidneigh, 345 F.3d at 1182.
227. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S.Ct. 2488 (holding state causes of action against HMOs
for negligence completely preempted). See Horst & Rosenberg, supra note 20 (noting that any
mention of Miller was conspicuously absent from Davila).
228. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added).
229. Miller, 538 U.S. at 342 (emphasis added). The Court specifically noted that they “have
never held that state laws must alter or control the actual terms of insurance policies to be deemed
‘laws . . . which regulat[e] insurance’ under § 1144(b)(2)(A).” Id. at 338.
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subtle, further demonstrates the Court’s concerted retreat from the
strictness of Metropolitan Life and the McCarran-Ferguson factors.230
A critical aspect of the McCarran-Ferguson factors was the first
factor: whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a
policyholder’s risk.231 The word “effect” is a noun, meaning “something
accomplished, caused, or produced; a result, consequence.”232 In the
context of the McCarran-Ferguson factor, this means that the
transferring or spreading of the policyholder’s risk is the result or
consequence of the state law.233 Unless the risk is transferred or spread,
the law did not regulate insurance.234 On the other hand, the word
“affect” is a verb, meaning “to have an influence on or effect a
change.”235 This requires one to ask whether the subject influenced the
decision, and in the context of the savings clause, whether the state law
substantially influences “the risk pooling arrangement between the
insurer and the insured.”236 Whether they are used as verbs or nouns,
“affect” and “effect” have subtle differences that play an important role
in understanding the Court’s gradual shift from—and now break with—
the narrow confines of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.237
It is not difficult to say that the mandated-benefits or AWP laws
changed the substantive terms of the insurance contracts at issue, but it is
harder to prove that a law influenced the decision-maker without looking
to the result. By moving away from the McCarran-Ferguson factors and
introducing a new test, the Court has signaled that it no longer focuses
solely on whether the contract terms have changed, but whether the law
“substantially affects the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer
230. See text § IV(E), infra and notes 228-45.
231. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 743 (emphasis added).
232. 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 78 (2d ed. 1989). In the collective and abstract,
“effect” refers to the “results in general,” id., as well as “a contemplated result, a purpose,” id. at 79.
“Effect” may also be a verb, meaning “to bring about (an event, a result); to accomplish (an
intention, a desire).” Id. at 79.
233. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 743.
234. See, e.g., id. at 742-44.
235. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000).
236. Miller, 538 U.S. at 342.
237. Compare the following sentences, which distinguish the two. Affect: The boss’s attitude
affected the efficiency of the employees; The weather should not affect our plans, as billiards is
played indoors. LAURENCE URDANG, THE DICTIONARY OF CONFUSABLE WORDS 12 (1998).
Effect: The arbitrator effected a compromise; We easily effected the changeover from electric to gas
heat. Id. As these examples make clear, “effect” looks to the end product. The arbitrator produced
a compromise just as the mandated-benefits law produced a change in the policy terms; the
arbitrator may have influenced the parties to compromise, but in the end, a compromise was
reached. “Using affect (= to influence) for effect (= to bring about) is an old error.” BRYAN A.
GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 24 (1998).
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and the insured.”238 Miller does not ask, nor does it require, that the
state law regulate the substantive terms of the contract.239 Nor must the
state law actually spread risk.240 Instead, the emphasis is on the risk
pooling arrangement,241 which is conceptually different from the ink and
paper constraints of the written policy terms.
For many district courts, Miller did little to change how they
interpreted bad faith claims. Some hardly analyzed these claims using
the new test,242 and many simply failed to appreciate the differences
238. Miller, 538 U.S. at 342; Horst & Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 40 (noting that Miller
removes any consideration of whether the state law forms an integral part of the insurance policy
from the new analysis). E.g., Rosenbaum v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, No. 01-6758, 2003
WL 22078557 (E.D. Pa., Sept. 8, 2003) (second part of the Miller test “differs significantly from the
first of the McCarran-Ferguson factors which asks ‘whether the [law] has the effect of transferring
or spreading a policyholder’s risk’”). See Mazer, supra note 18, at 14 (suggesting that later higher
authority has eclipsed prior decisions that held state bad faith statutes preempted under Pilot Life);
contra Alter, supra note 173, at 4 (refuting Mazer’s conclusion that the Miller test opens the door to
state law regulation of ERISA plan insurers); Gregory Primstone and Michele Johnson, Rush
Prudential: Savior of Pilot Life?, 15 HEALTH LAWYER 7, 8 (2002) (Rush Prudential reaffirms Pilot
Life).
239. Miller, 538 U.S. at 338 (“[w]e have never held that state laws must alter or control the
actual terms of insurance policies to be deemed ‘laws . . . which regulat[e] insurance’ under §
1144(b)(2)(A)”).
240. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc., v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 339 n.3 (2003). The Court noted
that the Ninth Circuit, in Cisnernos v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 134 F.3d 939, 945-946 (9th Cir. 1998),
aff’d in part, rev’d and remanded in part, UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358
(1999), held that California’s notice-prejudice rule did not spread the policyholder’s risk within the
meaning of the first McCarran-Ferguson factor. Miller, 538 U.S. at 339 n.3. But in Miller, the
Court held that notice-prejudice rule would satisfy the new two-pronged test, stating that the new
test only requires “that the state law substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the
insurer and insured.” Id. (emphasis in original).
241. Miller, 538 U.S. at 342. There are three categories of state laws that should satisfy the
“substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement requirement.” Pittman, supra note 182, at 601.
First, those laws that have a “substantial impact on insurers’ and insureds’ abilities to negotiate for
different types of insurance arrangements than the one that the state law mandates.” Id. Second, the
state law could mandate the terms and conditions of insurance arrangements. Id. Third, because
they limit the types of insurance arrangements into which insurers and insureds can enter, id. at 601
n.24, those state laws that “impose utilization review requirements, establish external review
obligations, mandate other procedures and conditions on the types of benefits that insurers must
offer the insured, and regulate the manner in which insurers must provide medical benefits” would
also satisfy the second prong. Id. at 601.
242. Mazer, supra note 18, at 14 (noting that most courts that have addressed the issue of riskspreading with regard to a state law have favored conclusion over analysis). See Revells v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1366 (M.D. Al. 2003). The state statute in Davila,
which affects medical decision-making, affects risk spreading, and, therefore, it may be “possible
that a statute like the Texas law could be used to discipline the decision-making of ERISA plans.”
McLean & Richards, supra note 20 (noting that because Davila did not address Miller, “the extent
of the state power to regulate ERISA plans run by third-party administrators remains in limbo”). Cf
Barber v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 383 F.3d 134, 143 n.11 (3d Cir. 2004) (Miller “demands
more than whether a law substantially affects the insurance arrangements between the insurer and
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between the common sense-McCarran-Ferguson test and the Miller
test.243 Some courts simply skipped over the “regulates insurance” step,
using complete preemption to deny bad faith claims against employee
benefit plans.244 While this approach to bad faith may have been
vindicated by Davila,245 those courts neglected the Supreme Court’s
insured”) (emphasis in original).
243. E.g., Dolce v. Hercules Inc. Ins. Plan, No. COV/A/03-CV-1747, 2003 WL 22992148
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2003) (equating the first McCarran-Ferguson factor to the second part of the
Miller test in a parenthetical) (“examining Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute under the then applicable
first McCarran-Ferguson factor, which is virtually identical to the second prong of the Miller test).
Cf. Elliot v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[b]ecause of the
similarities between the Metropolitan Life and Kentucky Association approaches, it is well worth
considering the substantial body of case law applying the older test”). But see Allison v. UNUM
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 381 F.3d 1015, 1027 (10th Cir. 2004) (“we must now determine if the recent
decision in Miller has somehow affected its prior analysis of whether Oklahoma’s bad faith law
regulated insurance within the meaning of ERISA’s savings clause preemption provision”). In
Allison, the Tenth Circuit held that Oklahoma’s bad faith law met the first prong of Miller’s test, but
decided that since the law did not “affect the substantive terms of the insurance contract,” the law
did not meet the second prong of Miller. Id. at 1027-28.
244. Kidneigh, 345 F.3d at 1185-86 (holding that “Colorado bad faith claims are preempted by
ERISA because they conflict with ERISA’s remedial scheme,” and in the alternative that such
claims do “not fall within ERISA’s savings clause, and as such [are] expressly preempted); Elliot,
337 F.3d at 1147 (“[b]ecause the present case ‘involve[s] the sort of additional claim or remedy
exemplified in Pilot Life,’ it falls within § 1132 preemption”); Bonnell v. Bank of America, 284 F.
Supp. 2d 1284, 1288 (D. Kan. 2003) (“[t]he court is not inclined to engage in a detailed analysis of
whether the Kentucky Act regulates insurance within the meaning of ERISA’s savings clause under
the new legal standard announced in Miller, . . . when it is patently clear that, regardless of the
outcome of that inquiry, plaintiff’s claims under the Kentucky Act are conflict preempted under a
well-established body of case law that dates back to 1987 [Pilot Life].”) (emphasis added).
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania exemplified the disparity between the analyses in these
cases that were written by the different judges within the district. One judge in particular, Judge
Clarence C. Newcomer, has painstakingly analyzed Pennsylvania’s statute prior to, Booz v. UNUM
Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 93-2326, 1993 WL 313372 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 1993) (holding a claim
made under Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute to be preempted by ERISA), and immediately
following, Rosenbaum v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., No. 01-6758, 2003 WL 22078557 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 08,
2003), Miller. Judge Newcomer recognized that nine other Eastern District judges ruled contrary to
his position in a 2002 decision in the Rosenbaum case. Id. at *3-*4. Beyond his own analysis,
Judge Newcomer also pointed out what he perceived to be the flaws in those other decisions. Id. at
*7-*18. Over the course of ten years and a handful of Supreme Court ERISA decisions, Judge
Newcomer has reversed his analysis from finding preemption, Booz, supra (holding a claim made
under Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute to be preempted by ERISA), to now finding “savings,”
Rosenbaum, supra (saving Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute from ERISA preemption while applying
the Miller test). In Rosenbaum, Judge Newcomer rejected the analysis of two contrary cases, saying
that, “[w]hile both of these cases correctly recite the second prong of the Miller test, neither actually
applies the standard as presented by Miller. Rather, both revert to the very different standard
provided in the first of the McCarran-Ferguson factors.” Rosenbaum, 2003 WL 22078557, at *5.
245. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2493 (holding state causes of action against HMOs for negligence
completely preempted). But see Barber v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 383 F.3d 134, 144 (3d Cir.
2004) (holding that the risk of punitive damages is too attenuated to be deemed to substantially
affect the risk pooling arrangement).
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shift in savings clause jurisprudence.
V. CONCLUSION
The McCarran-Ferguson Act codified the rights of the states to
regulate the insurance industry while ERISA stripped the states of any
ability to regulate employee benefit plans. Despite the different
philosophy in the two pieces of legislation, the Supreme Court borrowed
the test for state insurance regulation and adapted it for employee benefit
plan regulation. Thus, the McCarran-Ferguson factors, which were
created to protect states’ rights to regulate insurance, were being used to
deny states the right to regulate employee benefit plans. Miller changed
this uneasy and uncomfortable dichotomy by finally giving ERISA its
own test, one that is free from the constraints of a competitive history
and also substantively different from its predecessor. It is not just a new
label with the same old result.
Matthew G. Vansuch
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